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AN ABSTRACT 
In De Trinitate Augustine of Hippo (354-430) gave 
his most complete analysis of the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity. The most crucial part of his logical 
analysis, Books V-VIII, shows Augustine attempting to 
handle the seeming logical dilemma of one God, yet 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. At the outset of his 
investigation, Augustine apparently had two concepts 
in mind. First, he accepted the Bible as authoritative; 
and obviously he accepted the idea that this authorita-
tive Bible taught that God was one, and yet also three 
in some way. Also, Augustine worked from the contempo-
rary understanding of Aristotle's categories in attempt -
ing his l anguage analysis to decipher what cou ld and 
should be said of the Godhead. 
Augustine tried to r emove terminological confusion 
which obsc ured the discussion of the Trinity in the late 
fourth century, and he also attempted to strip from the 
terms used of the Godhead the things which could not be 
said of God. Basically, he af f irmed that God is one, yet 
three, and that God is immutabl e. In hi s estimation, 
f or God t o be God there could be no change in the Godhead . 
Three primary words were us ed to describe this Godhead: 
substance, person and r e l at ion. But, if these terms en-
tailed the idea of mutability, they were inaccurate and 
could not apply to the Godhead. But language must be 
used if anything is to be conveyed about God. There-
fore, because Augustine accepted the thesis, on Biblical 
authority, that God is one God, yet Father, Son and 
Spirit, he had to strip from the terms that which en-
tailed mutability. His result might be called spiritual 
substance, persons, and relat ions. 
The view of reality projected by the Bible was, for 
Augustine, the true projection, and the scientifically 
demonstrable was not all of reality. He made no pre -
tense of giving a proof of the Trinity; rather, he 
acknowledged the precedence of faith over knowledge, 
and tried to make more credible that which faith affirm-
ed. 
The real point of cr iticism, then, is one 1 s frame 
of reference. Either there is a spiritual world, or 
there is not. If it exists, perhaps language must be 
adjusted to describe it. Certainly reali ty is not known 
indepen dent ly of language; yet language may distort the 
view of reality by inaccurately protraying it. Augustine 
redefined his l anguage to portray that which he accepted 
as reality. Words, for _ him, were functional, and not 
determ ina tiv e. A~though human lan guage can hardly de -
scribe th e spiritual world which is immutable, only by 
using this language with care f ully gua rded definitions _ 
can the spiritual world be discussed. 
Therefore, if one expects~ Trinitate to be a 
testable proof of the Trinity, it fails miserably. How-
ever, if one grants the possibility of a triune God, 
Augustine's work is most helpful in coming to a better 
understanding of the nature of that God. 
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INTRODUCTION 
No other doctrine is so fundamental to the 
understanding of the Christian faith, and yet so elusive of 
precise interpretation, as that of the Trinity. Augustine 
of Hippo (354-430) well knew the intrinsic problems with 
such a task as giving an accurate depiction of the doctrine, 
as he states near the beginning of his work De Trinitate: 
"I am compelled to pick my way through a hard and obscure 
subject" (I.3.6.) 1; and "in no other subject is error more 
dangerous, or inquiry more laborious, or discovery of 
truth more profitable." (I.2.5.) 
The Early Church 
From the first days of the Christian church, the 
problem of understanding the doctrine of the Trinity was a 
matter of practical interest. Early investigations of the 
doctrine were guided by such extraordinary confessional 
declarations as the "baptismal formula. 112 The early 
lunle ss otherwise noted, bracketed references refer to 
the Book, Chapter, and section of the main text of the 
study: Philip Schaff, gen . ed., A Select Library of the 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, 
vol. 3: On the Trinit y , by St. Augustin, trans. Arthur 
West Haddon, revised with an introductory essay by William 
G. T. Shedd (Buffalo: The Christian Literature Company, 
188 7 ) . 
2 Ma t the \'I ?. 8 : l 9 - - " i n t he name of the Fa the r l and of 
the Son, and of the Ho1y Spirit." 
2 
Christi ans believed in God, and they believed i n God with 
the dis tinc tions of Father, Son, and Spirit. These early 
Christians prayed t o Christ , be li eved Hi m to be the Son of 
God and God Himse lf , and expected His return to jud ge the 
world. The natural co nsequen ce of th is belief was for t hem 
to examine carefully the relationship of th is Son to the 
Father, while all the time working from the basis of the 
fundamental principle of the i r heri ta ge , monotheism . Like -
wise, when they wrestled with the way to understand the 
nature of · the Godhead and of the Son's rel at ion to the 
Father, they soon turned to the relation of the Spirit to 
the Father and the Son. Thus, in these examinations, the 
church was· faced with the intricate dile mma of how to 
unde~stand the concept of Father, Son, and Spirit, yet one 
God. They had to consider how an immaterial being such as 
God could be conceived as three; and then, when the 
threeness had been established, they yet had to justif y 
some way of considering the se as one. In the second 
century, Athenagoras express ed this concer n by saying that 
Christians ''know God and His Logos ... Lind/ what i s the 
Spirit," and he added t hat they also "kno\'1 what is t he 
unity of th ese three, t he Spirit, the Son, and the Father, 
ar,d their distinction i n uni ty . 113 They accepted the· 
3Har r y Austryn Wol fson , The Phil osophy of the Church 
Fath e ~s, 3d ed. {Cambr i dge : Harva r d Univers it y Pre ss , 
- ·'JRT -19 70,, p. 308. 
3 
idea of the three in the one God. However, in coming to 
grips with how they might credibly explain one God in three, 
the early church wrestled long, and, at times, bitterly. 
Augustine of Hippo 
Augustine's life and intellectual background well 
equipped him for the struggle with the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Augustine, who was the son of a pagan father and 
a Christian mothe r, received the education of a rhetorician. 
Because he was not easily satisfied with naive solutions to 
the ultimate questions of life and reality, he explored for 
himself the philosophies of his day. Augustine embraced 
and subsequently rejected Manicheanism, skepticism, and 
aspects of Nee-Platonism until he had, as he describes in 
his Confessions, a co nversion to Christianity. From that 
time, he expended his eminent abilities as philosopher and 
theologian examining, explaining, and propagating his newly-
found Christian philosophy. 
In De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine exp lains that all 
intellectual pursuits must serve to assist the Christian 
in under standing the faith of the Scriptures. With his 
conversion had come a change in his attitude and purpose . 
For the converted Augustine, philosophy assumed a subser-
'/ient role, a role of nou r ishing and deepenin g the 
under stand in g of t he Christian faith . No ionger could 
phJl oso phy be pursued as a study for its own sak~. How 
likely it was that Augus tine would soon turn his abilities 
4 
and interest -to examining and attempting to explain the 
perpl�xing doctrine of the Trinity. 
De Trinitate 
Augustine produced several shorter discussions of the 
Trinitarian ·doctrine. References are found in: Contra 
sermonem Arianorum; Collatio cum Maximina; Contra Maximinum 
haeret1cum; Letters� and CXX; and De civitate Dei XI, 10. 
However, it is in De Trinitate that Augustine gives his most 
complete and mature explanation of his notion of the 
Trinitarian doctrine. Augustine has been venerated both 
as a philosopher and a theologian, by the medieval and the 
modern church, by the Roman and Protestant churches; one of 
the major reasons for the high esteem of Augustine has 
·been the influence of his closely reasoned treatment in De
Trinitate. As one critic has said of his contribution:
Augustine 1 s treatise on the Trinity ranks 
as one of his foremost works, and indeed as 
one of the ablest presentations of the doc­
trine in Christian literature. Few have 
wrestled with its discouraging problems or 
penetrated its mysteries so successfully as 
Augustine. He brought to the task a keen 
philosophic mind and a theological grasp 
which have seldom been rivaled.4 
Whether justifiably or not, Augustine 1 s De Trinitate has 
been recognized as a high-water mark in the history of 
4 Cyr i 1 C . R i ch a rd son , 11 The En i gm a of the Tri n i t y, 11 
in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, ed. Roy W. 
Battenhouse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 
p. 235 ..
.. 
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interpr eting the doctrine of the Trinity, as the prev ious 
quotation would indicate. 
Earl y in De Trinitate Augustine explains that his 
purpose therein is to demonstrate that the Trinity "is the 
one and only and true God, and also how the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit are rightly said, believed, {an~7 
under stood , to be of one and the same substance or essence . " 
(I.2.4.) The problem faced by Augustine was that of the 
inter-relations of three in one, and one in three. In De 
Trinitate, Augustine applies himse l f to th e ontological 
distinctions, to those distinctions dealing with the act ual 
Being of God, rather than those distin c tions exp res sing 
God's association with creation. Not God creating, redee ming, 
and sanctifying His people, but God Himself as distin c t 
from creation serves as Augustine's subject of anal ys is. 
How can one understand the Being of God, as three in 
one and one in three? In dealing \llith suc h a question, _De 
Trinitate divides int o two main sections ; (1) the exege -
tical section, Books I -VII, in which Augustine deduces th e 
doctrine of the Trinity f r om the Scriptures by examining 
the passages, and comparing, contrasting, and refuting 
objections; and (2) the speculative , Books VII-XV, in 
which he attempts to illustrate the Trin i ty by analogies 
found in nature and in the human mind. Our interest li e s 
primarily with a portion of th e exe get ica l part, particu-
lar 1y Books V-VII. 
6 
A Continuing Skepticism 
Although August ine's formulation of the doctrine of 
the Trinity yet remains th e one a ccepted by the majority of 
Protestant and Roman church bodies today, it m~st be admitted 
that his solution to the Trinitarian question has not gone 
uncontested through the years. Many scholars, both theo-
logians . and philosophers, continue to object to, refute, 
and disparage the one in three and three in one of De 
Trinitate. Adolph Harnack, the noted theologian, is one 
prime example of the objectors. His major criticism seems 
to be that, although Augustine credibly establishes the 
unity of the Godhead, in the process he actually destroys 
the possibility of true multiplicity within the Godhead. 
Harnack says: 
We can see that Augustine only gets beyond 
Modalism by the mer e assertion that h2 does 
not wish to be a Modalist, and by the aid 
of ingenious distinctions between different 
ideas . .. for Augustine employed the 
whole resources of his philosophy in the 
endeav our to overcome the contradiction 
which could not be overcome.~ 
In another place Harnack calls these distinctions made by 
Augustine . in De Trinitate "sacred paradoxes. 116 
Another critic, L. L. Paine, says: "How so logical 
a thinker could have thus lost himself in the mazes of 
SAdolp h Harnack, History of Dogma, 7 vols. (London: 
W i l l i a m s a n d N o r g a t e , 1 8 94/ , 4 : 1 3 l , n o t e . 
6Ibid., p. 135 . 
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monism and played jumping-jack with his own logic would 
be i profound mystery to any one who had not studied the 
history of human speculation. 117 Perhaps with tongue-in-
cheek, Paine implies that he understands Augustine's foolish-
ness because he can see that the history of thought mul-
tiplies examples of such wrong thinking. Augustine is 
mistaken, and grossly so, according to Paine; but such 
mistake is natural to man, and is quite understandable. 
Are Harnack and Paine correct in their evaluation ? 
Does Augustine fail in his purpose? Has history given gre at 
esteem to this philosopher and his De Trinitate unduly? 
This kind of question forms the crucible for our study of 
Augustine's statement of the doctrine of the ontological 
Trinity. 
A Projection 
In this study of De Trinitate, there will be three 
main sections and a concluding statement. The first section 
will give a more complete and detailed understanding of the 
problem of the doctrine of the Trinity in the historical 
milieu, and of Augustine's frame of reference which colored 
his analysis of the doctrine. The second section will deal 
with Augustine's attempt to establish the unity of the God-
head. In the third section, the very complex problem of 
7Levi Leonard Pain e , Critical Hi s tory of the Evo-
lution of Trinitariani sm ( Boston: Houghton, Mifflin , and 
Company, 1900 ), p. 82 . 
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the denial of singleness in the Godhead will be examined. 
In this final section, Harnack's criticism will either 
dethrone De Trinitate, or cru mble itself. Then, we shall 
make some concluding observations concerning Augustine's 
analysis. 
I 
SOME ESSENTIALS IN UNDERSTANDING DE TRINITATE 
The Milieu of Augustine's Day 
Augustine's formulation of the doctrine of the 
Trinity came only after many years of long and laborious 
analysis and interpretation of the Scriptures by other 
churchmen. Often, however, this work was mixed with the 
philosophical bias of or simple misunderstanding on the 
part of the particular church father. A brief account of 
some of the previous labor will no doubt give .· an indication 
of the strength or weakness of De Trinitate, as well as 
an indication of the turmoil in which the early church 
found herself in trying to give a clear statement to the 
perplexing notion of one in three. 
The possibility of three subsistences in one Godhead 
was occasion for much controversy in the early church. As 
the church attempted its resolution of the concept, two 
tests became a ''Rule of Faith 11 in the matter; the baptis-
mal formula of Matthew 28 and the true Deity of Christ 
establi s hed the boundaries for discussion. 1 No analysis 
1senjamin Brec kinridge Warfield, 11Trinity, 11 Inter-
national Standard Bible Encyclopedia, 5 vols. (Grand 
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1939), 5:3022. 
1 0 
could renounce or neglect either of these two concepts; 
they established the controls for all examination. The 
three Persons of the baptismal text, and the true Deity of 
the Son were fundamentals to the Christian faith. 
However, extremes in interpretation appeared quite 
quickly, and_ the emphasis of the extreme led to unsatis-
factory solutions. 
Subordinationism 
In the second century, the prevailing thought of Philo 
and the Middle Platonists held powerful sway over the 
developing Christian church. As a result, the way in 
which the Son was understood to be true Deity suffered 
compromise at the hands of some. This Platonized form of 
Christianity associated the Son with the pagan Logos, 
which, as a result, placed Him in a halfway position bet-
ween God and man. This overemphasis is understandable; 
in the attempt to give a credible explanation of the 
plurality expressed in the Rule of Faith, the unity of the 
Godhead suffered misstatement, and became incomprehensible. 
The Son became a kind of 11 second class 11 form of God, and 
subordination resulted. 
Perhaps an historical example of thi s kind of over-
emphasis is appropriate . In the second century Logos 
controversy, Justin Martyr des c ribed the Son as the first-
born of creation, and the "en t ire Logos." Although he 
11 
thought of the Son as existing before creation as a power 
and a person, he said that He was generated by the Father 
with a view to, and for the sake of, creation. As one 
fire kindles another, the Son was generated by the Father. 
The result was a subordination of the Son to the Father, in 
the essence of the Deity, and not just in the economy. 2 
A similar, though more thorough, perversion occurred 
in the fourth century . Arianism proclaimed that God is 
unbegotten and without beginning. But He is not the Father 
from eternity, by His very nature; He is only Father as a 
result of creation . Prior to the creation of the world, 
God brought into existence a kind of 11intermediate being 
to act as a medium through whom he created all things, a 
distinct 1 hypostasis 1 , or 1 essence 1 , called in Scripture 
wisdom, son, logos, image of God, etc.; and He also called 
into existence a third and lower hypostasis, namely, the 
Holy Spirit. 113 As a kind of lower form of God, the Son 
supposedly · was created, produced, or generated by God out 
of nothing, and endued with the closest approx i mation of 
the perfections of God Himself. Thus, the Son was, as 
2Herman Bavinck, The Doctrine of God . tran s . William 
Hendriksen (Grand Rapid s : Wm. B. Eerdmans Publi shing 
Company, 1951), p. 276. 
31bid., p. 288. 
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Robert L. Dabney has said, a "deputized divinity, 11 used 
by God as His agent in all His works of creation and 
redemption.4 
11 Subordinationism 11 fits both of these examples because, 
in both, the Son is no more than a lower form of the 
Divine essence; He has not been, both would say, from 
eternity of the same essence of God. Only at the point 
of creation is there a need to distin gu ish the Son fr om t he 
Father. At the very best, the Son is in only a subordinate 
relationship to the Father. 
The early church wrestled with this problem of 
subordinat,onism; With an ove r emphasis of the three , the 
true unity of the Godhead is destroyed; · but the unity must 
be affirmed. Eventually the concept of essential 
subordination was branded heresy by the Council of Nicea 
in the fourth century. 
Monarchianism 
Another error of the early days of the church tau ght 
that the Father, Son, and Holy Spir i t were so completel y 
identified, that God only reveal ed Himself at different 
times in the form of on e of the thr e e . The th r ee Pers ons 
were thought of as only differe nt expr e ss i ons in the life 
of God. At one time, God a ppeare d as Fa t her, th en as Son, 
and yet again a s Holy Spirit. A va r iation of mona r c hian ism 
4Robert Lewis Dabney, Sy l 1abus Notes of the C.our se ~f 
Syst,.:1i:1:1ti c an_d Polemic Theo -1ooy_, 5th ,2a:7·Richmond: 
Pr esby ter i an Committee of Pu~fication , 1871) , p . 176. 
13 
taught that these appearances were only "modes" of the 
existence of God, and · hence resulted the name "Modal ism." 
Sabellius was the most prominent of the modalists. 
He taught that Father, Son, and Spirit were merely three 
names for one and the same God. There could not be a 
trinity of essence in the Godhead, but merely one of 
revelation; there could be no real distinctions in the 
Divine Being, but the Divine unity could only reveal 
Himself successively in three modes or forms. The relations 
expressed by the three different names are coordinate, and 
as a unity they describe the one God expressing Himself 
diversely. These differences were used by God to meet 
the different needs of the occasioni therefore, there was 
no permanence about the modes of expression. The conse-
quence of this modal ism entailed no real incarnation of 
.God. no personal and indissoluble union of the Godhead 
with the manhood in the incarnation. When the functional 
roles were completed, each of the functional titles ceased 
to be significant. 
Thus, the Father, Son, and Spirit could only be one 
and the same Being, but each could only be an expression 
of different functions of God as He is known through and 
by creation. There could be no such thing as ontological 
distinctions in the Godhead; only when God manifested 
Himself to and through creation could economic distinctions 
e x i s t . T h e G o d o f S a b e 1 1 i 11 s w a s , t h e r e f o re , a mo n a d , a 
single God appearing in th r ee different forms. God 
14 
assumed these three different forms, according to 
Sabellius, by a process of expansion and contraction. 
At the end of the process, the Trinity ceased to exist 
in any form. 
This Sabellian form of monarchianism is particularly 
important to us, because it is this 11modalism 11 of which 
Augustine is accused by Harnack. 5 Certainly, this is a 
pitfall which Augustine had to avoid if he hoped to give 
a credible explanation of the Trinity . 
Nicea 
When the Nicene Council met to consider the eterna l 
( I 
Sonship and o p---00'\fo-<:t,v , it rejected s ubordinationism by 
saying that the Son is "homoousios toi patri. 11 Although 
Sabellianism, as such , was not an issue, the council 
rejected forms of monarch i anism by implying that the 
Persons wer e Persons in the Being of God, and were not 
mere ly econom i ca l manif es tations with re spec t to the work 
of God in th e world. Nothing l ess was at stake at Nicea 
than the rejection of pol ytheist ic mythology in the form 
of Arianism, on the one hand, ;and the reten ti on of the 
Deity of Christ on the other . Nicea attem pted to choose 
the correct path to maintain the Deity of Christ and reject 
Ar i an i s m . 11 
5Harnack, 4:13 1, note. 
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The Cappadocians 
Although Nicea was a triumph over improper perceptions 
of the nature of God, distortion continued in many areas. 
The Council of Constantinople (381) demanded and received 
widescale acceptance of what Nicea had determined. This 
success at Constantinople was made possible by the 
prominence of three theologians called the "Cappadocians." 
As had been done traditionally, the Cappadocians began 
their investigations of the doctrine of the Trinity from 
the standpoint of the plurality within the Godhead. Three 
"hypostases" or "forms of being" were one God. They 
considered·these.three to differ primarily in terms of 
derivation� They used the now well-known analogy in an 
attempt to depict the Trinity: the Trinity is like three 
men, Peter, James, and John. These are three individuals 
who have something in common, manhood. Because they have 
manhood as a common factor, this trinity could be properly 
described as 11 three man." The Cappadocians \'/ere quick 
to acknowledge, however, the limitations of the analogy; 
in their opinion, the only actual distinctions inherent in 
the Trinity were those of derivation. This meant that the 
Father was underived, the Son was of the Father, and the 
Spirit proceeded from the Father and Son. As Cyril 
Richardson has observed: 
Thus, the 'hypostases' are not particular 
instances of a 'universal 1 , the divine 
'ousia'; that would imply tritheism. The 
Cappadocian idea is more subtle. The 
. . I 
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nature of the Godhead more nearly corresponds 
in their thought to Aristotle's idea of a 
particular concrete existence lprote ousia), 
not to the 'deutera ousia' which members of 
a species have in common.6 
Obviously, the Cappadocians were attempting to make a 
careful distinction between "ousia" and "hypostasis." 
The ousia in the Godhead is identical in each Person . 
However, the analogy of manhood breaks down, because it 
is simply a generic term and fails because it ex hibi ts 
the qualities of the Aristotelian "deut.era ousia." 
Nevertheless, the Cappadocians established the use 
of the Greek words, "ousia" and "hypostasis," in distin-
guishing the nature of the Trinity. However, the obvious 
affinities with Sabellianism continued to produce misunder-
standings. We shall return to the terminological develop-
ments, but for now it is important to note that the Greek 
statement of the nature of the Trinity prior to Augustine's 
effort conceived of God as three hypos tases and one ousia. 
Augustine's Frame of Reference 
None can deny that everyone has a frame of reference, 
inclu ding basic presuppositions, which significantly 
affect one's basic outlook. Two aspects of Augustine's 
frame of referente are extremely important in the 
understanding cf De Trinitate. 
6Richar:-ds on, " Enigma," p. 237. 
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Christian Faith and the Authority of the Scriptures 
The primary assumption in all of Augustine's work 
· $Ubsequent to his conversion is that faith must be prior 
to true knowledge; one must "believe in order to know, 11 or 
11 praecedit fides, sequitur intellectus. 11 For Augustine 
religious faith preceded knowledge and was the key to that 
knowledge. As a natural consequence, he could begin his 
investigation of the Trinity only on the acceptance of 
certain presuppositions~ priori. These are propositions 
accepted as true only on the testimony of the Bible. Such 
reliance on the Scriptures is a trait Augustine held in 
common with those for whom he wrote~ Trinitate; he attempt s 
to arrive at a deeper intellectual understanding of the 
accepted facts concerning the Trinity. The data given by 
the Scriptures include the unity of God; His manifestations 
as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and the equal Deity of all 
three persons. This much had been accepted by the 
church; Augustine faced the task of deciphering how th e 
church could intelligibly think of the God who has thu s 
revealed Himself. 7 
Perhaps one might say that Augustine thought it enough 
to demonstrate the rationality of the Trinitarian doctrine 
to those who already believed the doctrine. That such 
seems to have been the case is indicat ed by August in e 
himself: 
7Leonard Hodgson , The Doctrine of the Trinity, 7th 
ed. (London: Jame s Nisbet and Co., 1964), pp . 147-1 48 . 
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Beginning, as I now do henceforward, to speak 
of subjects which cannot altogether be 
spoken as they are thought, either by any 
man, or, at any rate, not by myself; although 
even our very thought, when we think of God 
the Trinity, falls (as we feel) very far short 
of Him of whom we th i nk, nor comprehends Him 
as He is; but He is seen, as it is written, 
even by those who are so great as the 
Apostle Paul 'through a glass and in an 
enigma'. 11 (V.1.1.) 
In co n c 1 u d i n g B o o k V I I , A u g u s t i n e s a y s : 11 A n d i f t h i s 
cannot be gras ped by the understanding, let it be held by 
faith, until He shall dawn in the heart who says by the 
prophet, 'If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not 
understand'." It is from this foundation of faith that 
Augustine draws upon all his abilities to gain some 
understanding of the interrelationship of the individuals 
of the Trinity. All of the sciences had to be subordinated 
to the service of nourishing and deepening the fa i th; they 
had to function for the sake of elucidating the Christian 
philosophy, to enab l e those who believed to come to a 
better understanding of the faith as it is presented in 
the i~ord of God. 
Therefore, one must admit that Augustine's treatise 
makes no pretence of being a unique argument to establish 
the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity, so much as it is 
an e1ucidation of that doctrine. Apparently Augustine's _ 
intent in the De Trinitate is to explain as rationa ll y as 
possible t he teaching of the Scriptures concer ni ng the 
Trinity. This~ priori fai t h principle is essent i al to t he 
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understanding of what Augustine does in De Trinitate. 
Faith precedes knowledge, and the scriptures are true . 
Therefore, Augustine must accept what the Bible teaches 
and explain it as clearly as possible. 
Aristotle 1 s Categories 
The Aristotelian categories play a significant role 
in Augustine 1 s treatment of the Trinitarian doctrine. By 
employing the categories to his own advanta ge , Augustine 
attempts in Books V-VII to gain some light upon the 
distinction between substance and accident, and upon the 
general problem of predicamentals; by using the categories 
he classifies the things that can be said of God. 
What are the categories? The ordinary meaning of 
/ KA'11opl.o.. is 11 predicate. 11 Aristotle 1 s categories embrace 
the major types of concepts governing or defining all of 
scientific knowledge. The categories are: reality or 
substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, 
position, possession, acti vity, and passivity.8 The first 
of the categories, substance, has among its members 
individual substances. 9 The rest of the categories are 
a list of the "widest predicates which are predicable 
9second ary s ubsta nces are also s ubstances, but not 
individuals. Seep. 27. 
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essentially of the various nameabl -e entities, i.e ., which 
tell us what kinds of entity at bottom they are."10 
One use of the concept of category is to aid langua ge 
analysis. Of course, these language distinctions have to 
be more than just mere mental representations; they must 
refer to, represent, or embody something, or they are 
void of meaning. It is by using · this scheme to help in 
language analysis that Augustine attempts to give a 
credible explanation of the Trinity. By using the philosop-
hical analysis available through the use of the categories, 
Augustine attempts to get beyond the often misleading forms 
of language used by others to explain the nature of the 
Trinity. ThereforP, the categories enable language 
distinctions to describe metaphysical distinctions in De 
Trinitate. 
That Augustine found the categories extremely import ant 
in his study of the Trinity is quite obvious. Near the 
beginning of Book V Augustine says that God is 
... good without quality, great without 
quantity, a creator though He lacks nothing, 
ruling but from no position, sustaining all 
thin gs without 'having' them, in His whole-
ness everywhere, yet without place, eternal 
without ti me, makin g things that are 
changeable , without chan ge of Himse1f, and 
without passion. (V.l.?..) 
Curiously, Augustine eliminates two of the categories from 
this list, substance and relation; t hen he denies the 
lOw. D. Ross . Aristotle (London: Methuen & Co., LTD, 
1965). p , 23. 
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propriety of using these terms such as quality and 
quantity of the nature of God. He wil l deal extensively 
with substance and relation, but initially he denies that 
the other logical descriptions can be made of God. 
l I 
Resume 
In the fourth ce nt ury, the church attempted to arti-
culate its belief concerning the Trinity . Basically, in 
its councils the church established the guards for the 
Trinitarian doctrine . God is one; the Son and the Spirit 
as well as th e Fath er are one God. Subordination and 
monarchianism were rejected as improper modes of explainin g 
the way the church must understand the Trinity. Just prior 
to Augustine's treatise, the Cappadocians carefully dis-
tinguished between hypostasis and ousia, but they did not 
explain to the church how three hypostases could be one 
ousia . From his assumption of the faith principle and the 
absolute authority of the Bible, and by the aid of the 
categories of Aristotle, Augustine wrestled to unravel the 
linguistic and lo g ical maze of the T~inity. 
I I 
AUGUSTINE'S ATTEMPT 
TO ESTABLISH THE UNITY OF GOD 
The Augustinian Method 
In the opening pages of De Trinitate, Augustine 
assumes what seems to be the traditional mode of beginning 
the analysis of the Trinitarian doctrine. He says that the 
study of the doctrine is an examination into the manner in 
which the aTrinity is the one and only and true God, and 
also how the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are 
rightly said, believed, {ani7 understood to be of one 
and the same substance, or essence." {I . 2 .4 .} The usual 
manner of the early church fathers, as in the case of the 
Cappadocians, had been to proceed from the mult iplicity 
of the Trinity to the unity. The question of the unity 
of the Godhead came subsequent to the analysis of the three; 
the earlier problem had be en to guarar.tee the Deit y of Jesus 
and the Spirit as well as that of the Father. Particularly 
among the Greek fathers of th e early church, the unity of 
the Godhea d received consideration on ly after the Son 
received full recognition as tru e God with the Father. 
Augustine seems to approach t he Trinit arian discussion 
from t he same traditional method. But exactly the oppos i te 
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is actually true in De Trinitate. For Augustine, the problem 
is to consider the nature or unity of God before considering 
the trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit. In the earlier 
days, the "One God" was identified as the Person of the 
Father; from this point the church examined the principles 
of generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit. 1 
But Augustine does not think of God as the Father; by begin-
ning with "God" he begins with the simple Divine nature or 
essence. 
At the beginning of Book VII, Augustine writes: there 
is "one God, one good, and one omnipotent, the Trinity 
itself." In De Civitate Dei Augustine says similarly that 
"one God is this Trinity." (11.10). Again in De Trinitate, 
he ex pl a i n s t ha t II the Tr i n i t y i s the one and on l y a n d tr u e 
God ... {anrJ.] are one and the same substance or essence," 
(I.2.4.); and "the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
constitute a divine unity of one and the same substance in 
an indivisible equality." (I.4.7.) 
Augustine starts from the assumption, then, that there 
is but one eternal substance in the universe. This one 
substance, or essence, is God. God, as Being, is essentially 
one. He is "una res 11 
-- ---_, 
"summa simplex essentia. 11 He affir ms 
lw. S. Bishop, The Oevelooment of the Trinitarian 
Doctrine in the Ni~ene and Athanasian Creeds, A Study in 
Theo1_Q_g_ical Defini t ion (New York: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1910), p. 39. 
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that there exists a numerical unity of essence, and not 
simp l y a generic unity. As God is Father, Son and Spirit, 
' the unity of essence is set squarely in the forefront.2 
God as Substance 
Augustine affirms that God is the only unchangeable 
substance by saying that 11 He is however, without doubt, a 
substance, o½ if it be better so to call it, an essence, 
which the Greeks call ousia. 11 (V.2.3 . )3 As a result, "we 
do not say three essences, so we do not say three great-
nesses, but one essence and one greatness. I say essence, 
which in Greek is called ousia, and which we call more 
usually substance. 11 (V.8.9.) 4 Again, he says that 11most 
of ourselves who treat these things in the Greek language, 
/ I / ( / 
are accustomed to say, )-"(o ✓ o-u-o-(av', ,-pEc.5 '\ .n100-1Q_O--Ec.s, 
or in Latin, unam essentiam, tres substant·ias. 11 (V.8.10.) 
Augustine considers first the Godhead, but what is 
the nature of that Godhead? Much of Book V deals with this 
very question. The terms involved, such as substance and 
essence, and the concept of a being or reality which could 
211 Unus quippe Deus ipsa Trinitas, et sic unus De~s 
quomodo unus creator"--Contra sermonem Arian., 3 . 
311Est tamen sine dubitatione substantia, vel, si 
melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci ousian vocant. 11 
411propterea 
0
sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic non 
dicimus tres ma'.;)nitudines, sed unam essenti am ~t unam 
magnitudine m. Essentiam dico, quae ousia graece dicitur, 
quam usitatius substantiam vocamus . " 
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be attributed to the Godhead, come from the realm of 
· philosophy. The Greek church used the term ousia in the 
sense of real existence or actual being, according to 
Augustine. Although Plato and the early philosophers had 
discussed the concept of being, Aristotle fixed for the 
later generations the actual connotation of the word ousia. 5 
Aristotle 1 s "ousia" 
Aristotle used ousia in Metaphysics Delt a 8, 1017b10ff 
as: 6 
5J. F. Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early 
History of Christian Doctrine, 9th ed. (London: Methuen 
a n d Co . , -7951) , p • 2 3 7 . 
6of Substance, Aristotle says in the ~ategories: 
4a10: "The most distinctive mark of substance appe a rs 
to be that, while remaining numerically one and 
the same, it is capable of admitting contrary 
qualities." 
4a19: "The same individual person is at one time white, at 
another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at 
one ti me good, at another bad. 11 
4a30: 11 It is by themselves changing that substances admit 
contrary qualities. It is thus that that which was 
hot beco mes cold, for it has entered into a differe~t 
state. 11 
4b17: "To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, 
that while remaining numerically one and the same, it 
is capable of admitting contrary qualities, the 
modification taking place through a change in the 
substance itself . 11 
Michael Durrant summarizes the various usages of ousia 
by Aristotle in Theology and Intelligibility (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 88, as: 
{la) something not said of a subject in the sense of 
a "simple" body. 
(lb) scDething not said of a sutject in the sense of 
an individual SJ.lCh-and-such. 
( , ' , , l" 2 J To T< 7t"' E v.,,.., 
( 3 ) ,; . r / d:o--r l.. t s e c o n d s u b s t a n c e ) 
(4) mat t er . ..., 
(5) form ( u '& -s ) . ., 
(6) for mal ex planation (. c. ~_Ttc v· ). 
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{l) the simple bodies: earth, air, fire, water, etc. 
These are called substances because they are not 
I ,.: .... '\G..\ \ I \ Ill""\,_ _ /(<:(,..,...(;-Vov"' . . . .......A,1 Ko.Ta.. Tov TW \/ To... o..11,1..,_ 
I 
''l..rITO-
They are 
not things said of a subject, but other things are said of 
them. 
(2) that not said of a subject, but which is the 
ex p l a n a t i o n ( a.:,rcv) o f a t h i n g be i n g w h a t i t i s . A n e x a m p l e 
would be the soul of an animal. 
(3) that not said of a subject, but which determines 
and indicates the individuality of the subject, and the 
destruction of which brings about the destruction of the 
subject. 
(4) a set of qualities which something else has in 
order for that something to remain the same something 
throughout a time period. This might be t hought of as the 
essence of the thing. 
Against the backdro p of Aristotle's definition of 
substance must be viewed all subsequent discussion of bein g , 
substance or es sence. A substance for Aristotle was that 
which persists through superficial change, and that which 
is qualified by predicates and cannot become a predicate 
of something else . A substance has quali-ties, and undergoes 
change in respect to the increase or decrease of its 
particular qua litie s. It is par excellence the subje~t of 
predication. A substance cannot exist without the predi-
ca bles; it i s a unity involving not only qualities but also 
an unknown element called matt er or subs tance; but su bstance 
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cannot exist in the abstract wi thout the other categories of 
predication.7 For Aristotle the real and intelligible re-
•mained one . 
Although true substance for Aristotle was individual 
substance, he did allow for what he called secondary sub-
stance. In abstracting that which is essential to the 
individual, generalizations can be made concerning those 
qualities. The individual is true substance, but once 
removed is the secondary substance of species. Such uni-
versals as species and genus do not exist apart, but only 
as they are found in the individuals. Substance, as the 
first of the categories, entails other categories. Therefore, 
it entails mutability . In the Categories Aristotle actu-
ally indicated that substance is characterized above all by 
its power to be the recipient of qualifications. (4al0) 
It is this understanding of substance which Augustine builds 
,,... I 
upon. God is substance, but substance without k'6ltr8 a c, rrc u.:>v, 
I 1/ / -"\ I , 
.... mocov t:Y~<v 0 ore no<tl v, 7T/J ..<J"Xe£V(V. 8 .9.J n 0'"\T I I /\ I ) 
Hypo stasis 
For Augustine ousia clearly means substance, but 
confusion results with another word which was being used, 
hypostasis. Although the Greeks made a distinction with the 
7rrofessor Ross says in Aristotle, p. 165: 11A qualit y-
less su bs tance is as impossib le as a quality whic h does not 
presuppose subs tanc e. The substance is the whole thing, 
including the qualities, rel at ions , ~tc., which form its 
essence, and this can exist apart. It i mpl ies qualities 
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word, Augustine finds it without clear distinction. Aristotle 
had used this word only in its literal meaning of "a 
standing beneath" or "that 1t-Jhich stands beneath." It 
could have referred to that which remains as a result of the 
action of subsisting, or the action itself. 8 Previously 
the word ousia had been commonly used as the underlying 
existence of any given thing, and hypo s tasis would often 
serve as its equivalent. Because it was thought to expres s 
the vehicle of all qualities, hypostasis was st ill thought 
to be equivalent to ousia at the time of Nicea. 9 Bethune-
Baker attempts to substantiate the argument that the words 
were used synonymously at Nicea by quoting Athanasius 1 de 
Deer 20 . There Athanasius repeats the Nicene anathema, with 
as the guarding phrase. In one of 
h i s 1 a t e s t \-Jr i t i n g s , A d A f r o s 4 , h e r e f u t e d t h e o b j e c t i o n s 
but these are not something out s ide it whi ch it needs in 
addition to itself. A quality, on the other hand, is an 
abstraction which can exist only in a substance. Ob-
viously, if this i s his meaning, Aristotle is thinking 
of substance as the individual thinR. Secondary sub -
tances (i.e., genera and sp ecies), being universals, 
cannot according to his own doctrine exist apart, but 
must be supplemented by the spec ial qualities of their 
individual members .~ 
8Bethune-Baker, Introduction, p. 237. 
9However, Bull, for one , thought the terms had been 
separated by the time of Nicea, and that the Council actually 
anathametized two heresies by using the two terms in a 
p a r a 1 1 e 1 fa s h i c, n . S o a c c o rd i n g t o vJ i 1 l i a 1n G . T . S he d d , Dog -
matic The~, 2 vols., 3d ed. (New York: Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1891), 1:270. 
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brought against the words as being non-scriotural by saying, 
11 hypostasis is ousia and means nothing else but simply 
b e i n g . 11 l O T he l ea s t t ha t c a n b e s a i d i s t ha t A t ha n a s i u s , 
one of the primary figures of the Nicene days, considered 
there to be no distinction between the two terms. However, 
certainly this is not the case with some of the Greeks, 
especially the Cappadocians. 
Only at Alexandria {362) were distinctions introduc ed 
to allow the separation of ousia and hypostasis. Fro m this 
time the church began to speak of 11 treis .h>.'.postaseis. 11 
Although confusion continued, the Greek fathers became more 
accustomed to use ousia to exoress the existence or essence 
or substantial entity of the Godhead, and hyposta sis to 
express the existence of the particularit y of the Father, 
Son, and Spirit. 
Basil of Caesarea, one of the Cappado c ians, explained 
the newly-found distinction by saying: 
ousia ha s the same relation to hypostasis as the 
common to the particular .... In the same 
manner, in the matter in question, the term 
'ousia' is common, like goodness or Godhead, 
or any similar attribute ... ; while 1 hypostas is 1 
is contemplated in the special property 9f Father -
hood, Sonship, or the power to sanctify. 
At this point, the church had reached a place of demarcation 
with the Greek terminology . From this time, hypostasis in 
lOgethune-Baker, Int roduct ion, p. 237. 
llEoistl e 24 , in Bethune-Baker, Int roduc tion, p. 238. 
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the Greek mode of expression would mean the oarticular 
personal existence of Father, Son, or Spirit. 
Apparently, this distinction was not entirely satis-
factory to Augustine. He says: "I say essence, which in 
Greek is called ousia, and which we call more usually 
substance. They indeed use also the word hypostasis; but 
they intend to put a distinction, I know not what, between 
ousia and hypostasis. 11 lV.8.9-10.) Perhaps Augustine was 
not fully apprised of the distinction made by the Greek 
terminology. 12 Or, perhaps he was not convinced that the 
distinction made was a credible one. Regardless of the 
extent of Augustine's knowledge of the Greek sources, he was 
not enabled by i the Greek terms to come to a satisfactory 
understanding of the unity of the Godhead. 
"Substantia 11 
Neither did the traditional Latin term, substantia, 
prove to be comoletely satisfactory to Augustine. However, 
he does use the Latin term to fill the vacuu m until he 
could establish a better understanding of the unity. For 
example, he says: "He who is God is the only unchangeable 
substance or essence, to whom certainly BEING itself, whence 
come~ the name essence, most especially and most truly 
. 
12oebate continu es as to whether or not Augustine had 
easy access to the Greek materials. See Harnack, 4:132, and 
TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian, p. 294. 
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belongs." (V.2.3.)13 In Augustine's understanding, there 
was a close parity between essence and substance, ousia and 
substantia, which is easily understood. Substantia, the 
v er b a l n o. u n from s u b s to , me a n s II t ha t w h i c h u n d e r 1 i es a th i n g 11 
or "that by which anything subsists or exists" or 11 the 
essence or underlying principle by which each res is what 
it is. 1114 Only that which has real existence is 11substance 11 
and a fortiori, that which has real substance is substance. 
Yet there was even more conf usion of terminology. In 
the Latin church, substantia was used to translate the~-
stasis of the Greeks, and, with essentia, to translate ousia! 
Augustine expresses this confusion by saying: 11that which 
must be understood of persons according to our usage, this 
is to be understood of substances according to the Greek 
usage; for they say three substances, one essence, or sub-
stance." (VII.4.8.) Terminology presented a definite 
barrier for the establishment of a c l ear apprehension of the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Confusion existed between the Greek 
and Latin terms, and within each language. 
13In V.9., Augustine says : "ut hoc int.e1ligatur cum 
dicimus essentiam, guod intelli gitur cum dicimus substantiam: 
non audemus dicere unam essentiam tres substantias; sed unam 
essentiam vel substantiam, tres aute m personas . 11 
( 
14Bethune-Baker, Introduction, p. 2Jl. 
" 
). 
,. 
► 
,. . 
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Augustine's Problems 
If Augustine is to give a credible explanation of the 
unity of the Godhead, he faces two barriers. First, he has 
to resolve the terminological problems created by the dis­
parity between the Greek and Latin words. Second, he has to 
extricate whatever term he uses from the Aristotelianism 
which certainly did accompany all language analysis. 
Perhaps the first problem can be resolved, but some 
critics do not believe that Augustine was capable of avoiding 
the second problem. 11 God cannot be said to be a substance 
term, " Durrant says , 11 i n the sense that, granted i ts use i n 
Christian thought� it cannot perform those rules or exhibit 
those features which Aristotle's substance terms do. 11 15 
Augustine's Solution 
Augustine's solution resulted from using substance in 
an 11 improper 11 fashion. (See VI.4.9. and 5.10.) By some it 
would be called an "illegitimate 11 usage of the term.16
However, in Augustine's own words, "improper" is the suitable 
term to describe his usage of substance. "It is clear that 
God is improperly called substance, in order that He may be 
understood to be, by the more usual name essence, which He 
15Durrant, p. 71. Durrant claims that substance, by 
definition, must be mutable. 11 • • • anything falling under 
the category of substance admits of accidents; indeed it is 
part of the very concept of substance that anything which 
fa'l1s under this category should admit of accidents"; p. 121. 
16Ibid., p. 87. 
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is truly and properly called; so that perhaps it is right 
that God alone should be called essence." (VII.5.lo.) 17 
In De Civitate Dei, Augustine's tour~ force appears 
candidly. He says there that "as from sapere comes sapientia, 
so from esse comes essentia, a new word indeed ... which 
the old Latin writers did not use, but which is naturalized 
in our day, that our language may not want an equivalent for 
the Greek ousia." (XII,ii) Augustine makes the step to 
relieve the terminological confusion by excising substantia 
as the most proper term, and substituting essentia. Verbal 
coinage does not provide new concepts; this is not the point. 
However, to substitute the precise for the ambiguous helps 
demonstrate what is not being said. 
However, it is by the purifying of essentia, or sub-
stantia, _ of its accretions produced by the categories that 
Augustine clinches the tour~ force. By this purification 
of the concept, he separates the notion from all "accidents . " 
Therefore, God can be considered as pure, unchangeable Being. 
Because he considers mutability as proper to Aristotelian 
substance, he realizes the abuse in caliing God substance, or 
even essence if by essence one means merely what substance 
meant universally. (VII.5.10. and V.2.3.) As Tillich 
has rightly said , "God is 'sum ma essentia', ultimate being, 
1211 •• • unde man if est um est Deu m abusive substantiam 
vocar i, ut nomine usitatiore intelligatur essentia, quod 
ver e ac proprie dicitur ; ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici 
op or t e ;it es sent i a rn. '' 
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beyond all categories, beyond · all temporal and spatial 
things. Even the categories of substance cannot be used. 11 18 
Augustine, by creating a fundamental difference between his 
concept of essence and Aristotelian substance, transformed 
the notion, thus eliminating the idea of mutation . 
Augustine says that "whether He be called essence, 
which He is properly called, or substance, which He is called 
improperly, He is called both in respect to Himself, not 
relatively to anything." (VII.5.10.) To have any real 
apprehension of the Being of God, there must be two levels 
of understanding of the notion of essence. There are, he 
says 
... other things that are ·called essences or 
substances ... /ihich7 admit of accidents, where-
by a change, whether great or small, is produced 
in them. But there is not accident of this 
kind in respect to God; and therefore He who 
is God is the only unchangeable substance or 
essence, to whom certainly BEING itself, whence 
comes the name of essence, most certainly and 
most truly belongs. (V.2.3.) 
Augustine argues that the things which change do not retain 
their own being; and that which can be changed, even though 
it is not yet changed, is able not to be what it is. For 
God to be and never not to have been, for Him to be unchange-
able, Augustine is bound to say that there is no possibility 
of accident, whether separable or inseparable accident, as 
the Greeks distinguished them. (V.4.5 . ) God alone is the 
1 8 Pa u l T i l 1 i c h , A H i s to r y o f C h r i s_ t i a !!__I.ho u g h t , e d . 
C. E. Braaten (New York: Harper and Ro•,•1, 1968). p. 115. 
. ., 
.,. 
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category of true and pure being. (V.2.3.) There is nothing 
a c c i d en ta l , n o r i s t h ere t h e po s s i bi li ty of a c c i d en t i n God , 
'because, � priori, there is nothing changeable concerning 
God, nor can anything be lost from His Being. (V.4.5.) He 
remains altogether what He is, and continues to be unchange­
able as He always has been. 
We pause to note what Augustine has accomplished. 
Confusion existed in terminology. Although he wavers between 
substantia and essentia, Augustine indicates that essence 
more properly describes the Being of God. Second, he does 
something radically different with the categories. Substance 
had been thought to be that to which something could be 
predicated, as accident. Aristotle's category of substance 
was restricted, by its primary definition, to the immanent; 
but Augustine applies it to the transcendent God. Augustine's 
reluctance to apply the word substance to God comes as a 
natural consequence of God not being the subject, in 
Augustine's opinion, of His own attributes; but rather what 
God has, He is. God is the only pure Being, because He is 
absolutely unchangeable and hence the only absolute Being. 
The Nature of the Godhead 
To what might that unity of essence or substance be 
likened? What is the nature of the unity? 
Augustine's argument in Book VII betrays the influence 
of Aristotle's various kinds of unity in ousia. (VII.6.11 .) 
► 
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It is not enough simply to say that Augustine lifts substance 
from the categories. He continues to wrestle with the 
possibility of using some of the previous understanding of 
ousia to conceptualize the nature of the unity of the Godhead. 
Harry A. Wolfson contends that Augustine chose as the best of 
the possibilities "a common underlying element. This 
is called unity of substratum.1119 Is Augustine satisfied
with 1 substratum 11 as the most proper description of the unity? 
This is not a paltry question, because its answer under­
lies the whole concept of the unity of the Godhead. Previous 
to this point, we have discovered that Augustine considered 
the unity to be singleness of essence. Here the question 
concerns the bearing of the unity on the multiplicity. In 
Book VII Augustine considers three possibilities in �e attempt 
to explain the unity. (VII.6.11 .) 
(1) Genus and Species
The first possibility is that the three Persons of the 
Godhead may be regarded as three species, and the one essence 
as one genus. Augustine reasons: 
For if essence is the genus, and substance or 
per�on the species, as some think, then I 
must omit what I just now said, that they ought 
to be called three essences, as they are three 
substances or persons. tVII.6.11 .) 
The example he uses to disentangle the prob1em of this 
terminology is that of horses, as analogous to species, and 
19wolfson, pp. 350ff.
' 
,. 
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animal as genus.20 But since it is improper to speak of
three horses as one animal, but rather they must be three 
animals, so it is impossible to speak of three species of 
the Trinity and only one genus, God. He uses the parallel: 
genus = animal/God; species = horses/Persons; therefore, 
as three horses are three animals, so three Persons of the 
Trinity would have to be three Gods. But this is the heresy 
of tritheism, and must be rejected. Thus, the first possibi­
lity is not a possibility at all. 
(2) Species and Individual
The second possibility is that the three Persons could 
be considered as three individuals -and the one essence as 
one species. The reasoning and the objections are parallel 
to those of the first possibility; here species and indi­
vidual simply take the place of the genus and species in the 
previous example. He says: 
But, if they say the name of substance or per­
son does not signify species, but something 
singular and individual; so that any one is 
not so called a substance or person as he is 
called a man, for man is common to all men, 
. . . so will the same reason reach these 
too. (VII.6.ll.J 
He uses as an example Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as three 
individuals of the species, man. The implied argument would 
20Although Augustine 1 s intention may be obvious, the 
argument seems incoherent. Three horses are not three 
species. 
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be as before: species= man/God; individual = Abraham/ 
Father, etc.; but as three individuals are three men, so 
three individuals of the Godhead would be three Gods. Again 
tritheism obtains, and this possibility must be rejected as 
being heresy. 
· {3) Substratum 
In the third case, Augustine says that "we do not 
therefore use these terms according to genus or species, 
but as if according to a matter that . is common and the same." 
) 21 (VII.6.11. The example he uses to express this unity, "as 
if according t o a matter that is common and the same," is 
that of statues made of gold. In another place Augustine 
explains the gold illustration by saying that "if gold is the 
Father, gold is also the Son, gold also the Holy Spirit. 1122 
The gold of the three statues could be the same gold, and 
each one of the statues would be gold; yet the gold would 
neither be genus to a species, nor species to individual 
statues. 
Augustine ultimately rejects the example of gold, 
however, even though it would fit Aristotle's concept of 
21 11 Non itaque secundum genus et species ista dicimus; 
sed quasi secundum communem eamdemque materiam. 11 
22Enar. in Ps. 68, 1, 5; quot ed by Wolfson, p . 351. 
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11 substratum. 11 It must be rejected because taking such an 
analogy literally will not do justice to the Trinitarian 
concept. Wolfson observes that Augustine definitely says 
that he "prefers 11 the ana lo gy of substratum to that of 
species or genus as the common unity of the Trinity. 23 
However, Wolfson's assertion is only partially correct. He 
correctly realizes that Augustine chooses substratum as a 
better analogy than genus or species, but he does not then 
acknowledge Augustine's ul timate rejection of this ana l ogy 
also. The obvious argument against the substratum analogy, 
an argument with which Augustine was no doubt familiar, would 
be: one could easily take the substratum, as in the example 
of the gold, to be a pre-existing material, which would have 
existence prior to the three statues. That is, God, thought 
of as the unifying substratum, could be thought of as 
existing prior to the three Persons . There would be, there- -
fore, a prior God, and three'P~rsons, making four Gods! The 
three Persons, and the Godhead from which the three come, 
would all be God. When the implications of this analogy are 
considered, it breaks down just as the species and genus 
argument did. 
Augustine admits the limitation of this analogy 
immediately after using it. (VII.6.11 .) Substratum gives 
23wolfson, o. 326. 
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the impression that the many are formed "out of" the 
substratum, and this cannot be the case with the Trinity. 
He reasons: 
We say three persons of the same essence, or 
three persons one essence; but we do not say 
three persons out of the same essence, as 
though therein essence were one thing, and 
person another, as we can say three statues 
out of the same gold; for there it is one 
thing to be gold, another to be statues . . . 
But in the essence of the Trinity, in no way 
can any other persons exist out of the same 
essence. (VII.6.11.) 
He proceeds to say that this is, in man's mind, a great 
mystery. For the three Persons to be equal to each other 
singly is a matter which man cannot comprehenrl because bulk 
and space restrict human understanding of the three in one.24
Substance transcendentalized does not fit the 
Aristotelian understanding of the first category. It does 
not have the same qualities because it is beyond the realm 
of all accident or·change; it is beyond the material. 
W. G. T. Shedd calls the substance of the Godhead "Spiritual 
Substance." In the material realm, he argues supportatively 
with Augustine, for there to be three different forms of 
24ourrant says: . .  one would hardly expect 
1 God 1 in its Christian use to perform those 
roles or exhibit those features which such s�b­
stance terms exhibit, for God is not part of 
that scheme which such terms are an integral 
part, namely the scheme of material bodies and 
spatio-temporal existents . . . 11; p. 71. 
II 
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gold, there must be three different pieces of gold. Shedd 
says: 
But spirit is not subject to the conditions 
of matter; and as the whole human soul may 
~ of it be in every part , and every point 
of the body, at one and the same instant, 
so the Divine essence may all of it be in 
each of the three Divine persons simultane-
ously. It is no contradiction, taking the 
nature of unextended spiritua l substance 
into vi ew, to say that the one numerical Div in e 
essence is indivisibl y and wholly present at 
a million points of space at the same time, 
without makin g it a million of essences.25 
Shedd also app lies Augustine's analogy of the mind. Thre e 
simultaneous forms or modes of existence do not necessarily 
imply three different minds or substances, as in the 
instance of mind or immaterial substance. "One and the 
same entire mind may re member, understand, and will simul-
taneously. Memory, understanding, and will are three 
simultaneous forms, or modes of one and the same mind or 
spi rit. 1126 
Thus, it is understandable that there i s another 
alternative to Aristotle's figures of unity in ousia. 
Augustine's concept is very similar to, but no t commensurate 
with, substratum. When the one essence is said to be in 
three Persons, Augustine does not mean t hat esse nce is a 
fourt h thing. A kind of spiritual substance must be under-
stood, which does not have the qualities of bulk and space. 
2 5 W il l i a m G • T • S h e d d , D o g rn a t i c 1· h e o l o g y , 2 v o l s • , 3 d 
ed. (New York: Charl es Scribner's Sons, 1891), 1:298 . 
26 _Ib·id., p. 275 . 
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But this brin gs us to the next section dealing with some 
of the implications of the unity of the Godhead. 
Implications 
(l) Interpenetration of the Persons 
"The simultaneous existence of the undivided and total 
nature in each of the three persons, the Nicene trinitarians 
endeavored to illustrate by the figure of circumincession . 
. ~ . There is a continual inbeing and indwelling of one 
person in another. 1127 It i s this kind of interpenetration 
that Augustine maintains. 
There is no substratum, not a three 11out of" one, but 
a three "in" one, and one 11in 11 three. We must keep in mind 
several propositions: for Augustine God is abso lute Being, 
simple and indivisible with no accident nor change of any 
kind; He transcends the categories. With this starting 
point, Augustine could affirm an equality of the three. He 
considers it a matter of "catholic faith t hat the Father, 
and the Son , and the Holy Spirit intimate a divine unity of 
one and the same substance in a n indivisible equality." 
tV.4.7.} With the numer i cal unity of t he Trinity there is 
no division of the essence of God. The whole nature is one 
God, and the whole nature is in each of the divine Persons. 
The three have the same eter nit y, immutability, majesty and 
27 
_Ibid., p. 299. 
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power. (De Doctrina Christiana 1 .5.) Thus each Person of 
the Trinity is God, and they are all together one God; each 
is the full essence, and all together are one essence. The 
divine essence with all the absolute perfection of the per-
fect God is identically the Trinity of Persons, and each of 
the three Persons. Augustine says: 
But the Father and the Son together are not 
more truly than the Father singly, or the 
Son singly. Both together, therefore, are 
not anything greater than each of them 
together .... And so the Son and the 
Holy Spirit together are just as grea t as 
the Father alone, s ince they are as truly . 
So also the Trinity itself is a s great as 
each several person therein. (VIII.1.2.) 
And, 11 in the highest Trinity one is as much as the three 
together, nor are two anything more than one. And they 
are infinite in themselves. So both each are in each, and 
all in each, and each in all, and all in all, and all in 
one. 11 (VI.10.12 . ) 
To this thought of the inseparable intercommunion of 
the three Persons expressed by Augustine, theologians have 
/ 
applied the termrrcp<x~,~~ The verb from which the term 
originates entails two senses: "to move" and "to contain." 
Both senses are included in the term; the Persons interpene-
trate each other, and each contains the other. 28 With this 
interpenetration, Augustine thus elim ·inates the remnant of 
subo rd inationism, and establishes more clearly and sharply 
2BBethune-Baker, Introduction, ~- 226, note. 
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the consubstantiality of the three Persons and the numerical 
unity of their essence. 
What then is the nature of tne unity? It is not a 
generic unity, nor a unity of species, nor even a unity of 
substratum. Tne interpenetration of the three in one makes 
it impossible to think in these terms. Although it: is a 
bit: of a enigma, as Augustine admits (VI.10.12.), the 
Trinitarian nature is of spiritual substance, with three 
Persons completely penetrating one another, with the whole 
Being equal to each and each equal to the whole. 
t2) Trinality 
God is trinal, not triplex . This consequence hardly 
demands noting, for all that has been said previously 
expresses this concept; but it is a common problem involved 
in attempting to explain the Trinity, and Augustine deals 
with it. (VI.7ff.) 
Victorinus had earlier suggested that God should he 
des c r i bed a s " three fol d ,t' or " tr i p 1 ex . " Th i s , q u i t e 
naturally, would cause one to think of three individuals, and 
the problem of tritheism would enter again. 29 The triple is 
composed of three different substances; it has parts, and is 
· complex. Augustine argues that if God were triple, the 
Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Spirit, would be less 
29J. N. 0. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrine ·s, 2d ed. 
(New York: Ha rper and Brother s , 1960), p. 273. 
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than two of the Persons together. But this cannot be the 
case because of the nature of the unity of the Godhead, 
•which must be totally free from change. If addition could 
occur within the Godhead, God would be mutable. Therefore, 
there is not threefoldness or triplicity in God, but only a 
pure trinity. Triplex is an impossible term; trinal fits 
the occasion better. The trinal, however, is without parts, 
and is incompl ex . It denotes one simple substance in three 
forms. Thus, Victorinus incorrectly regarded God as triplex; 
the better term to use is trinal. 
t3) Operati ons~ extra 
Augustine insists on making all the divine action, ad 
ext ra, the work of all three Persons ind is tinctly. From 
the oneness and identity of essence of the three divine 
P er so n s Au g u s t ~ n e c on c 1 u d e s t ha t t he P e r s on s ha v e, ~ e x tr a , 
but one will and operation. If the three have identically 
the same esse nce, the conclusion is that they can only have 
one will and operation. He says: 11The Will of the Father 
and the Son is one, and t he ir operation insep arable . 11 
(II.9.) "When one of th e three is mentioned as the author 
of any work, the whole lrinity is to be understood as work-
ing." (Enchiri ctiory_ 38) "The Catholic faith holds that the 
works of t he Father and Son are not separable ... not only 
of the Father and the Son but also of the Holy Spirit 
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are the works inseparable. 113O In relation to all of 
creation, the three work as "one principle." (V.14.15.) 
Because of this premise, Augustine is forced, so he 
thinks, to take a unique interpretation of the theophanies 
of the Old Testament. The popular opinion had been that 
these theophanies were manifestations by which the Son 
alone had appeared to the patriarchs of Old Testament times. 
Augustine deduces that each of these manifestations is neces-
sarily the work of the whole Trinity. He says that he 
cannot accept the opinion that some special Person of the 
Trinity appeared (II.15.26. ), and therefore he concludes 
that 11we must believe that by means of the creature made 
subject to Him, not only the Son, or the Holy Spirit, but 
also the Father, may have given intimations of Himself to 
mortal senses by a corporeal form or likeness." (II.18.35.) 
The natural question to -arise, and one considered by 
Augustine, would be: does this ad extra action obliterate 
the several roles of the three Persons? Augustine denies 
this effect, as it was not that the Trinity was "born of 
the Virgin Mary, and crucified under Pontius Pilate ... 
Nor again, that this trinity descended in the form of a dove 
upon Jesus .... Nor yet that this Trinity said 
'Thou art my Son'. 11 (I.4.7.) While it is true that the 
Son, as distinct fro m the Father, was born, suffered, and 
30 Jo. tract. 20.3., quoted by Edmund J. Fortman, The 
Triu ne God (Phi la.delphia: Westrninister Press, 1972), p. 142. 
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rose ·again, it remains equally true that the Father 
cooperated w1th the Son in bringing about the incarnation, 
passion, and resurrection . Only on the basis of the special 
manner in which each of the Persons possess the divine 
essence can the roles in the external operations, which are 
proper to the individual Person, be attributed to Him. The 
nature of each Person's origin makes certain attributes in 
external matter s appropriate to Him. The later Latins used 
the word "appropriat io n" to express Augustine's idea. 31 
That Augustine did not explain the theophanies of the Old 
Testament with the idea of "appropriation" is a mystery. 
Augustine, by using this concept later termed 
"appropriation , " does not perform a unique service. Earlier, 
Basil had said that all things "'are performed equally among 
the worthy by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit' 
(f.Q.. 189.7.), and the Greek Fathers had also recognized that 
there is a unity of operation in God and had used it to 
prove the unity of the nature of the three. 1132 Although 
Augustine 1 s work in this area is not totally original, it 
does establish the precedent for the further discussion of 
the matter. 
The works, individually, of the three are in no way 
a contradiction to the cooperation of the working. The 
31E. Portali~, A Guide to the Thought of Saint 
Augustine, trans. Ralph J. Bast ian (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1960), p. 132. 
32Fortman, p. 143 . 
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individual ascriptions of particular tasks are just notes 
of emphasis, indicating the Person through whom the exter-
nal operations proceeded. All of the actions of the Trinity, 
whether they are ·commonly assigned to one Person or another, 
are the work of the Trinity. 
(4) God is His attributes 
In his Categories Aristotle attempted to make possible 
the definition of all that is. With God, however, there can 
be no such definition, because He is Being itself. No 
predicamentals, in the form of the Aristotelian categories, 
apply to Him. To express the notion of this important point 
in precise terms, Augustine formulated a doctrine which was 
to remain the permanent possession of Christian philosophy 
and theology. He says that God is what He ha s. 33 "He who 
is God is the only unchangeable substance or essence, to 
whom certainly being itself, whence comes the name of es-
s e n c e , m o s t e s p e c i a 1 1 y a n d m o s t t r u ·1 y b e 1 o n g s . " ( V . 2 . 3 . ) 
The proposition that God is His attributes follows naturally 
from the proposition that God i s Being, with no change . 
That which can change cannot retain its being, since being 
in this sense is the transcendent Being which Augustine 
recognizes as the nature of God. Man, according to Augus-
tin e 's idea, is not his attributes, but has them. Thus, the 
33Augustine says in De Civitate DeL XI. 10.3.: 
11quae habet haec et est, et ea omnia unus est." 
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categories can be used to describe the nature of man and all 
creation, likewise; but these same categories actually 
cannot apply to God at all sin c e He has neither strength 
nor wisdom nor any of His other attributes, because in Him 
they are one with His very Being. God does not have attri-
butes; He is His attributes. 
Augustine deals with a possible objection persisting 
in the understanding of the church of his day. (VI.1.1.) 
The problem was: If the Son, according to Paul, is the 
Power and Wisdom of the Father, is the Father Wisdom Him-
self, or only the father of Wisdom?34 If God is only the 
father of Wisdom, · and \.Jisdom is the Son, there would be an 
inequality in the Godhead, according to Augustine. If it 
is the case that God is the father of Wisdom, then He like-
wise is the begettor of His own greatness, goodness, eter-
nity, . and other attributes . . (VI.1.2.) But this argument 
is actually refuted earlier where Augustine proved that 
those attributes belong to the very essence of God. (V. 
10.11.) In like manner as he has shown that there are not 
three essences, there are not three greatnesses, nor good-
nesses nor eternities. As he previously explained that the 
substance of God is totally beyond the scope of Aristotle 1 s 
concept of substance, likewise all the attributes of God 
are beyond the scope of the categories . They are not 
341 Corinthians l :24: "Christ the power of God, 
and the wisdo m of God." 
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pred i cam en ta 1 s, in the sense of the Categories. 11 Let the 
same be said also of goodness, 11 he reasons, "and of the 
eternity, and of the omnipotence of God, and, in short, 
of al1 the predicamenta1s which can be predicated of God, 
as He is spoken of in respect to Himse1f, not metaphorica11y 
and by similitude, but properly." (V.10.11.) His 1ine of 
argument proceeds: Things partake of greatness, and it is 
therefore one thing to~. and another to be great, such as 
a great house, for examp1e. The great house is not absolute 
greatness itself, but is great because of greatness. But 
there must be an absolute greatness by which all things that 
are great, are great. Augustine calls this greatness 
11 primarily great. 11 But if God were great with a greatness 
not Himself, there would be a greatness greater than God; 
but nothing is greater than God. Therefore, God must be 
great with that greatness by which He Himself .:!2 that 
greatness. Thus, it is the same thing for God to be, as to 
be great . This same conclusion obtains for the other 
attributes of God also; therefore, Jesus as Wisdom is not 
something different from the Father of Wisdom. Because God 
is the attributes which are spoken of Him, He is Wisdom 
itself. Therefore, when Jesus is spoken of as the Wisdom of 
God, it is not in a way in which the Father or the Spirit 
are disassociated from being Wisdom. God, the Godhead, each 
of the three Persons of the Trinity, is His attributes . 
51 
Also, as a natural consequence of this principle, 
whatever belongs to the divine nature as such should in the 
most precise language be ex pre ss ed in the singular, since 
that name is unique. Just as there is only one essence, 
there can only be one greatness, 11for it is the same thing 
to God to be, and to be great. 11 (V.10.11.) Therefore, again 
as a consequence, each of the three Persons is the attribute, 
and the Trinity itself is the attribute. The Son is the 
equal of the Father in all the attributes, as is the Holy 
Spirit; and yet there is not a plurality of essence. (VI. 
3.4. and VI.5.7.) 
As a concluding observation to the principle that God 
is His attributes, we note that Augustine rightly determine s 
that there can be no addition to the nature of God. God is 
not like ordinary substances, e . g., Aristotle's substance, 
which does increase by addition, and decrease by sub-
traction. The problem involved is the concept of spatial 
or temporal substance, as opposed to the spiritual substance 
of God. Because God is spiritual, rather than spatial and 
temporal, it is nonsense to conceive of God growing by 
addition, or decreasing in any manner. 
But a possible objection might be raised in the light 
of the Scripture's teaching that the spirit of man 11 is 
joined unto the Lord. 1135 However, perfection cannot 
increase. When the finit e i s joined to the infinite, there 
351 Cor i nthian s 6:17. 
... 
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is no . increase in the infinite. "Our substance therefore 
is changed for the better when we become His sons; and He 
·at the same time begins to be our Father, but without any 
change in His own substance." (V.16.17.) Of course, it is 
with reference to the essence of God that Augustine makes 
this observation. It is not that there is a change in the 
essence of God by the addition of sons, but that the person 
himself, man, is changed. There can be nothing added to 
God, by definition. Perfection cannot be perfected. 
A Short Evaluation 
Perhaps at this point a few remarks on Augustine's 
concept of the unity of the Godhead would be appropriate, 
to summarize and prepare for the discus s ion in which he will 
attempt to deny the singularity in the Trinity. 
"Never, up to this time, had the divine been set in 
relief so strongly in its relation to the three divine per-
sons.1136 Subordinationism, as a result, is dealt a severe 
blow by Augustine, and only occasionally raises its head 
in subsequent discussion within the church. Because of his 
unique method of beginning with the unity of the Godhead, 
Augustine rejected those distinctions which had previously 
been made between the Persons, such as in the ad extra 
actions. Because the older method had rel eg ated to the 
different Per sons 0 of the Trinity different distinctive 
"6 t 
.J Portal i e, Guide, p . 131. 
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responsibilities, different worth values easily res ulted. 
Augustine purified the conce pt of th e Trinity from this 
possible error. Each Person of the Trinity is equal to 
the sum of the other two Persons in essence, and likewise 
the Trinity i s equa l to the essence of any of the three 
Persons. On the basis of this equality within the nature 
of the Godhead, there can remain no vestige of essential 
subordination. Of course, this great strength in reasoning 
also provides the groundwork for a possible weakness. The 
gr eat unity principle cou l d create real problems in the 
attempt to establish a viable understanding of what the 
three ind iv iduals ca n be . In simple terms, the more con-
crete the 11one, 11 the harder it must be to estab li sh the 
"three. 11 
Augustine's new starting point has yet to be rejected . 
Whereas, - in the past, the mode of speaking would have been, 
"We be l i eve in the one God the Father ... and i n our Lord, 
Jesus ... 11 , 37 Augustine ' s great influence i n this matter 
resu l ted in the new direction of the ps eudo-Athanasian 
Creed. This later Creed begins : "This is the Catho li c 
faith, that we worship one God in the Trinity and the Tri-
nity in unity ." Augustine ' s influence can hardly be denied. 
To use Bishop's words: 
37The Nicene Creed. 
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The Augustinian concept ion is distinc-
tively static and logical, while the 
Nicene conception is evo lu t i onary a nd 
genetic. The Augustinian concept i on 
dwells in the regio n of absolute being, 
far re moved fro m those ideas of time an d 
change an d li mi ta tion from which the 
Nicene orthodoxy had such c~9stant dif-
ficulty in guarding itself. 
Augustine's progre ss beyond the Nicene formula established 
the precedent for conceptualizing the Trinity. 
The positive assertion that essence must transce nd 
the accidental predicamentals was also a strong ly positive 
st~p forward in the Trini tar ian discussions. As long as the 
nature of God remained, in theoretical analysis, under 
Ari s totelian influence, progress in a ffir ming the true 
nature of God was at a s tand st ill. Augustine's transfor-
mation of the concept of transcendent substa nce, or 
spiritual substance, opened the way fo r his resclution of 
the problem of the predic amentals esse ntial to God. God 
can be His attribu tes . 
38s· h Lll 1 S op, p ... . 
II I 
AUGUSTINE'S REFUTATION OF "SINGLENESS" 
IN THE GODHEAD 
- For it must be devoutly believed, as most 
cert a inl y known fro m the Scriptures, a nd 
must be grasped by th e menta l eye with un-
doubtin g perception, t ha t there is both 
Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit; and that 
the Son is not the same with the Father, 
nor the Holy Spirit the same with the Fath-
er or the Son. I t sou gh t the n what thr ee 
it should call the m, and answered s ubs tan ces 
or persons; by which names i t did not intend 
diversity to be meant, but si nglene ss to 1 . be deni ed . (VII.4.9.) 
The Pr ob le m 
As Harna ck obs erve d , th e crucial point of Augustine 's 
argument comes as he attempts to give credibility to the 
three in one , r at her th an with the one in three. Augus -
tin e' s s tat ement just quoted so unds a bit unc erta in in what 
it int e nd s; he i s no more fi rm here than t o indi cate what 
he wish es to deny of t he Trinity, tha t is, ';singlen ess ." 
But for the argument a s a who1e to s tand logical investi-
gation, there must be a sa ti s factor y ana ly s is of wha t t he 
" m u 1 t i p 1 i c i t y " ~ , n o t j u s t \'I h a t i t i s n o t . 
1 11 
•• Qua esivi t qui t r ia di ceret ; et dixit s ubstan-
tias s iv e per s onas, quibus ncmini bus non divers i tatem 
int e lli gi voluit , sed sing ui arita t em noiuit ... " 
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As in the discussion of the unity of the Godhead, 
Augustine does not work in a void in attempting to explain 
the denial of singularity. However, Augustine's analysis 
begins first with the unity, and then seeks to explain the 
denial of singularity. The inherent danger of the earlier 
methodology is that of not getting beyond the three to 
establish the one, which would result, practically, in poly-
theism. The inherent danger in August ine' s method is that 
he will so firmly establish the one that trinality may be 
inconceivable. This is exactly the point of Harnack's 
accusation; he charges Augustine with not est ab lishing the 
thre e . He indirectly accuses Augustine of modal is m by 
saying: "We see Augustine only gets beyond Modalism by 
the mere assertion that he does not wish to be a Modalist, 
and by the aid of ingenious distinctions between different 
ideas . 112 
Harnack is really quite subtle . He says that 
Augustine escapes heresy: (1) because he asserts that he 
·does not wish to be a medalist; (2) because ingenious 
distinctions between ideas are made. Harnack apparently 
t hi nks that Augustine was self-deceived because of his 
great desire to get beyond modalism; he was deceived 
because he thought that clever wording would establish 
the truth of his thesis. 
2Harnack, 4:131, note. 
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How clever Harnack is! The first reason he attributes 
to Augustine is, of course, of no value whatever. If the 
·only reason Augus tine can offer in his arg ument to deny 
singleness is that he does not wish to be a modalist, who 
will even listen to him? Harnack makes Augustine sound ab-
surd, and thereby he prejudices the case against him. 
Merely to wish a conclusion does nothing toward assuring 
that conclusion. However, Harnack implies t hat Augustine 
uses linguistic maneuvers to achieve the desired end . But 
the second reason he attributes to Augusti ne need not be 
taken in this pejorative sense. No one ca n be confused by 
the intent of the word "distinction." Augustine does 
make distinctions in word s because of distinctions in ideas. 
But the word "ingenious" is quite deceptive in the conte xt. 
The word means : ll) having genius, having great mental 
ability; (2) clever, resourceful, original, and inventive. 
Now, what does Harnac k mean? Was August i ne clever, original, 
and inventive? Or did he merely bend word~ to extricate 
himself from a logical tr ap? Only Augusti ~e•s ar gument 
itself can indica t e the an swer. However , uet us be aware 
that what Augustine hoped has no bearing w~atever on what he 
accomplished ; that he would have wanted to escape modal is m 
has no bearin g what ever on whet her or not ~e did escape it. 
Harnack 1 s 1ns i nua tion should not be al1o we~ t o prejudice 
the case. 
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TeSelle claims that Gregory of Nazianzus was very 
helpful to Augustine by suggesting a way of developing the 
concept of the trinality. Gregory faced one of the Arian 
arguments, which could be stated in these terms: nothing 
can be said of God according to accident, since there can 
be no change in God; therefore, what is said of God must 
be said according to substance. Thus, the generated char-
acter of the Son, and the ungenerated character of the 
Father, must be said to be according to substance; and this 
would make two different substances! Gregory rejected this 
opposition of substance and accident, and spoke of relation 
between the Persons of the Godhead. Analogously, a human 
father is father only in relation to the child, and not 
according to his being, as such. Likewise, the Father of 
the Godhead is Father in relation to the Son; the Father 
is unbegotten in relation to the Son, and the Son is 
begotten in relation tot -he Father. 3 Probably Gregory's 
concept did establish the foundat1on for Augus tine's dis-
cussion of the "denial of singleness." 
Augustine himself faced the Arian argument. He 
explains his situation by saying: 
... among the many things which the Arians 
are wont to di spute against the Catholi~ faith, 
they seem chiefly to set forth this, as their 
most crafty device, namely, that whatsoever 
is said or und erst ood of God, is said not 
3Eugene Te Se lle, ~ugustine th e The~ lo gian (New York : 
Herd er and Herder, 1970), pp. 294 -296. 
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according to accident, but according to 
substance; and there fore, to be unbegotten 
belongs to the Father according to sub-
stance, and to be begotten belongs to 
the Son according to substance; but to 
be unbegotten and to be begotten are dif-
ferent; therefore, the substance of the 
Father and that of the Son are different. 
(V.3.4.) 
Augustine calls this argument a "crafty device, 11 or, 
as an alternate reading, "a cunning dilemma. 114 Apparently 
the Arians were basing their argument on the Aristotelian 
scheme of categories. The distinctions in the Godhead, 
they granted, could not be according to accident, because 
God can have no accidents without entailing the destructive 
notion of change. But, their other alternative destroys 
the basic unity of the Godhead by demanding three substances. 
If a.b.c. are the Persons of the Godhead, and each is so 
distinguished as substance, then a+ b + c = 3 substances. 
Theirs is a valid argument, if one is willing to grant 
that there are only two possibilities of solution. Their 
argument is logical when it deals with the material things 
to which Aristotle's categories can be applied. However, 
neither of the alternatives could be satisfactory to 
Augustine. To escape polytheism, or modalism, he could 
only reject the two solutions~ and offer a viable alterna-
tive. 
As we did in the orevious chapter, we must deal with 
the terminolo gica l considerations prop osed by the church 
4 11 ••• c allidissimum machinamentum." 
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·fathers, and by Augustine himself, as he attempts to offer 
his alternative solution. In this denial of singleness, 
three words figure prominently: ll) person, (2) accident, 
and (3) relation. It is through the interworking of these 
three words that Augustine offers his alternative. 
The Terminology of the Trinality 
ll) Person 
Augustine says that 11 when the question is asked, 
What three?, human language labors altogether under great 
poverty of speech. The answer, however, is given, three 
'persons', not that it might be (completel y) spoken, but 
that it might not be left (wholly) unspoken. 11 (V.9.) The 
word Augustine chooses to signify the 11 what three?" is 11 per -
son.11 At least on the surface, several problems arise with 
this terminology. Augustine himself is not completely 
satisfied with the terminology; but he says here and else-
where (VII.4.7-8.) that 11person 11 is the closest approximation 
he can give to what the three are. To prevent silence in the 
matter, he must use the terms available. 
The etymology of the word helps to understand the 
problem involved, and the subse~uent acceptance of this word 
by Augustine with his limited approval of it. Two words 
have to be cons idered, both the Latin "pers ona" and the 
I 
Gree k 11 7r p ey::;-wrrov. " 
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The basic meaning of the Greek term is 11 face" or 
"countenance. 115 The connot a tion of the word did not 
include an individual, per se, as we would speak of an 
individua ·1 today; rather it meant the 11appearance, 11 "form," 
or "figure" of an individual. Because the mask worn by 
the actors in the theatre resembled the human face, it was 
I 
called ,-17e,o-wrrov. The word then assumed the mea ning of th e 
part played by the actor. Thus, quite early the word 
entailed the idea of the part played by the individual. 
Later the word assumed the sense of denoti ng a man in his 
official position in society. Here then the intent meant 
the "public role" of the indi v idual. As a man filled cer-
tain societal functions, he assumed societal roles. Even 
later, perhaps under the influence of the Latin term, per-
sona, the word was given a technical sense which became 
common in legal documents . The general use of the word, 
however, as it was used in the days of the early church 
fathers, was 11 face, 11 or its equivalent, "presence." Kittel 1 s 
Theological Oictionary of the New Tes t ament contends that 
the church fathers aptly picked a word which had a wide 
range of meanings, which would be and subsequently was 
narrowed by the theological debate surrounding it. 6 
5Gerhard Kit t el (.ed.), Theo1og i ca 1 Di ct i ona r y of the 
New Te s tam e n t , tr a n s . Geoffr ey W~r om, I e y l Gr a n d Rap i d s : 
~Jm. B. Eer dniar.s Publis hin g Compa ny, 1 968) . 6 :76 8 . 
61bid., pp. 768-780. 
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Although the fathers no doubt did narrow the sense of the 
word in theological debate, the origin of the meaning of the 
word is quite important. The word, in its developing 
stages, connoted not the person, as individual substance, 
but rather the function, presence, role, or appearance of 
that individual. 
persona 
The Greek term is closely related to the Latin, 
persona. This word also connoted the idea of mask, role, 
or prominent personage. The word was employed to designate 
the man himse lf as far as he had this or that persona. 
Thus, slaves, because they did not possess any rights of 
citizenship, were not regarded by Roman law as having 
person a ; they were 1•1 ap r o sop o i II or II person a e ca re n t e s . " 7 
Today we hear the term 11 person, 11 and only approximate 
conceptuall y the original meaning of the term as it was 
known by the ear ly church. We hardly consider the distinc-
tions involved in the word in the early period. In 
contemporar y usage, the concept has come to involve either: 
(a) reference to a particular body, or (b) reference to 
individual personality, or (c) both. To understand 
Augustine's usage, however, we must revive the meaning of 
the word in hi s day; we must not ana l yze his usage on the 
basis of our usage. To give Augustine a fair treatment, we 
7Bethur.e-Baker, Introdu ct ion , p . 233 . 
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must keep in mind that the concept in his day connoted 
role, mask, or part played. 
Fourth Century Confusion 
Had Sabellius not entered the Trinitarian debate, 
perhaps Augustine would have had little trouble in assimi-
lating "person" into his Trinitarian vocabulary. But 
Sabellius did a great disservice to the church by contri-
buting to the confusion of the terms in the third century. 
He employed the word "person" in his modalistic system. He 
was concerned primarily with the unity of the Godhead, and 
allowed modalism to be his answer to the multiplicity 
question. For him, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were 
different phases of the one divine essence. "He seems to 
have adopted the language of the church so far as to speak 
I 
of three 'persons', using the term Trj)0 o-wif~ but in so 
different a sense ... that the word was altogether 
discredited in the East. 118 Sabellius remolded the term to 
fit his idea of expanding and contracting modalities. 
Because his "persons" were mere expressions of God which 
were manifested and then disappeared as God retained His 
original manifestation, the church rejected his idea of 
modalism as unsuitable. Because of Sabellius' distortion 
of the concept of the nature of God and his appropriation 
of rr p~ ~u .. ntc-,/ t o e x p re s s i c n h i s i d e a , t h e G re e k c h u r c h 
8Bethune-Baker, Introduction, p. 105. 
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rejected the term and adopted an entirely different word, 
( I 
'U 1T O o-'T 0... c:r ( s 
However, in the latter part of the fourth century, 
the new term was not totally accepted by all the church. 
Augustine himself says: "They indeed µse also the word 
'hypostasis'; but they intend to put a difference I know 
not what, between 'ousia' and 'hypostasis'; so that most 
of ourselves who treat these things in the Greek l anguage, 
I J I , -. ( I II 
are accustomed to say, p-<.o.,v' t>-uo-co.-1, rye c.s -urr oo-Ta..o-c.cs 
(V.8.9.) 
Augustine and persona 
rhe state of confusion in the fourth century is 
apparent. Perhaps Augustine was not aware of the new 
development of the Greek terms; or perhaps he was not 
satisfied with the distinctions hypostasis allowed. For 
whatever reason, he chooses persona as a more suitable 
term to explain the "what three?" Augustine says that he 
was contented with persona, for the lack of a better term 
and for the sake of "convenience." t VII.5.10.) 9 Yet, it 
was not totally satisfactory: II . we wish some one 
word to serve for that meaning whereby the Trinity is 
understo od, that we might not be altogether silent, when 
a s k e d , \'Iha t t h re e , w h i 1 e we c on f es s e d t ha t t hey a re t h re e . ·· 
(VII.6.11 . ) 
9nfor tassis igitur commodiu s dic;intur tres persone II 
b5 
But to say that Augustine uses the word does not 
necessitate the assumption that he used it as it had 
always been used before. Augustine squarely faced several 
objections to this word, which caused hi m to tailor the 
word to fit the needs of his discussion. He acknowledges 
the first objection by saying: "For person is a generic 
name, insomuch that man also can be so called although 
there is so great a difference beh1een man and God." That 
11 person" connoted the generic could be quite mi slead i ng. 
Augustine is attempting to say three per s ons, yet only one 
substance; but to use a generic term for three so methings 
entai Is that the three are instances of so me universal. 
At this place the same argument applies as the one in the 
1ast chapter dealing with ousia. Person, as a generic term, 
can hard ly be acceptab l e . On the one hand, it is qu i te 
impossible to speak of three horses as one animal; rather 
they must be three animals. Likewise, it i s impossible to 
speak of the Fath er , Son, and Spirit as person; rather th ey 
would have to be three ~e rsons. Un the other hand, substra-
tum is not a proper concept to apoly to the id ea of person 
either, because, as in the exa mple of the gold statues, it 
is one thing t o be geld, and another to be statues . As a 
generic term, "person 11 does not appropriately describe the 
"what three? " But the three do have an identity of essen ce . 
Admittedly, the term is not entirely accurate i n the 
✓ 
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situation, because "the supereminence of the Godhead 
surpasses the power of customary speech. 11 (VII.4.7.) 
Augustine must do the same kind of thing with 11person 11 
as he has done with "substance"; the term must ·be lifted 
from the limitations of the categories to be understood in 
anunextended or transcendent sense. The same possibility 
of criticism results in this situation, as it did with the 
lifting of substance to a spiritual substance. This is a 
concept the "natural man" does not comprehend, because 11he 
cannot think except under the conditions of bulk and space, 
either small or great, since phantasms or as it were images 
of bodies flit about in his mind." tVII.6 . 11.) But a 
Trinitarian Person must be just such that it is not limited 
to bulk or space. Augustine's 11person 11 does not perfectly 
I 
parallel what was meant by persona or rpo~~"o✓, even though 
its notion is embedded in the terms. The word has tak en 
on a new sense of its own. The concept is what W. G. T. 
Shedd calls an 
incommunicable characteristic of the 
Divine essence, that ... can subsist wholly 
and indivisibl y in more persons th an one. 
This distin guishes the Divine nature from the 
human. The latter can exist in more perso ns 
than one, but not as an 11 individual ." .. 
A trinitarian pe rs on is the entire Divine 
nature subsisting in a particular manner : 10 viz, as Father, or as Son, or as Holy Spirit. 
lOshedd, Dogmatic, 1 :273. 
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If one grants to Augustine the redefinition he 
gives to essence as a kind of spiritual substance, like-
•wise his redefinition of person as a form of sp ir itua l 
substance, in which there is simultaneous existence of the 
same divine essence, is credible. Either one must refuse 
to allow Augustine to make the step with substance, or t he 
possibility of his tailored concept of person must be 
granted on the basis of the same kind of argument as with 
spiritual substance. 
Shedd attempts to undergird Augustine 1 s argument with 
a reference to Philippians 2. Althou gh Augustine does not 
refer directly to this passage, it could be enlisted to 
demonstrate that the in ge nious distinctions in co ncept s do 
have Biblical warrant. There is in Philipp ians 2 authority 
to describe the Trinity as spiritual substan c e, simultane-
ously existing in three form s. Paul pa r.t rays a Trinitarian 
Person as a "form of God." Because the Greek phrase i s 
anarthrous, it cannot be the for m of God, but rather a for m 
of God. 11 There is, then, the poss ibili ty of more than one 
form. There must be a difference between these form s and a 
material body, because it was only in the incarnation that 
one of these forms united with humanity . However, when 
this much has been sa id, the language is found wanting in 
accurately depicting what the Per s on is lik e . 
llibid., p. 274. 
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Although the analogies Augustine uses in the second 
half of De Trinitate are helpful in trying to conceptualize 
the three in one, ulti mately they break down. No ana l ogy 
from man' s experience can proper ly depict how these three 
are -one. Perhaps Augustine's most famous analogy is of the 
memory, understanding and love; yet there must remain the "I" 
to whom these three belong. A substratum or unifying element 
i s requ ire d. Augustine himself admits the flaw in the 
analogies. (XV.22.42.) But that Augustine finds no exact 
parallel in nature for the three in one is no sufficient 
reason to renounce the logic of his argument. If one is 
willing to grant Augustine's presuppositions of the authority 
of the Biblical record, the concepts of the simplicity of 
the essence of God, and that God is Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, his deductions are quite sound. There are no paral-
lels in the realm of the material world to describe that 
which is not bound by bulk and space. Therefore, Augustine 
is at liberty to redef ine substance as spiritual substance , 
and person as the form of the "what three?" of the Godhead 
if the redefinition helps in understanding the concepts. 
For one to reject the transcendent sense of substance 
and person entails making a categorical statement about 
reality, rather than examining Augusti ne's lo gica l ana ly sis 
of transcendental ideas. lo d i smiss Augustine's argument 
on this basis wou l d be to d i smiss his assumption of Biblical 
authority. We are concerned to check his self-consistency, 
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not to refute the authority he recognized in the Bible. 
That would be a wholly different, and perhaps more 
.foundational problem to s tud y ; but it is not our topic. 
Another kind of irrelevant criticism is that used by 
Emil Brunner, which seems to play on the emotion rather 
than the intelligence. He says that 11we may order people 
to think thus: 'Thou shalt think these Three Persons as 
One• ·, but it is no use : there still remains an unc ert ain 
vacillation between Tritheism and Monothei sm. 11 12 Brunner's 
argument deals with man's inability to conceptualize that 
which has no true material analogy. This is the kind of 
emotional abdication which must be avoided. Augustine has 
involved hims e lf with a logical analysi s ; that it i s diffi-
cult for man to conceive of three in one should be no rea son 
to depreciate the argument. The self-consistent or self-
contradictory nature of August ine' s argument is the point 
of investigation, not th e conceivability of it. 
We take what Augustine has done with the concepts of 
person and substance as outstanding exa mples of philo-
sophical theology. The doctrine of the Trinity is not 
expounded by studying the etymology of the technical ter ms 
alone . The technic a l terms obse rve d apart from the context 
of Augustine's presuppositions hardly di sclose his concepts. 
For Augus tine, as it should be f or all Christian 
12H. Emil Brunner, po_gmatics, 3 vols . , trans. 01ive 
Wyon (Philade lp h·ia: Westminister Press, 1950), 1:239. 
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philosophical theologians, the study of the notions must 
also take into consideration the sourcebook of Christian 
· theology, the Bible. 
(2) Accident 
For Augustine, the three of the Godhead are called, 
with certain reservations, Persons. Once it is granted 
that Augustine has given a possible explanation of "what 
three?", there must likewise be a reasonable solution to such 
a question as: In what sense are the Persons distinct 
from one another? To say simply that there are Persons 
does not provide the answer to this question. 
Augustine prepares the argument for his concept of 
"relation" as that sense, by eliminating the accidental as 
a possible solution. He says: "That which is accidental 
commonly implies that it can be lost by some change of the 
thing to which it is an accident." (V.4.5.) 13 Because of 
his adamant rejection of any mutation in the Godhead, 
Augustine must generate a concept free of accident, yet one 
which explains the difference between the three. 
Accident rec~ived its common implication from the 
Aristotelian system. There are two possible ways of 
considering accident. An accident may be thought of as 
one of the predicables. There were five of these predicables 
1311Accidens autem non solet dici, nisi quod aliqua 
mutatione ejus re ·i cui accidit amitti potest. 11 
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f o r Ar i s to t 1 e : g e n u s ( y ~ it os ) , s p e c i e s c c'7J'o s ) , 
difference ( clc.o.c(>op.;_), property ( ('d'c~V' ) , and accident 
( IY~,-.l} i; $ 7 ids ) . The s e t e rm s e x pre s s e d the v a r i o us re 1 a t i on s 
in which universal terms could s tand to the subject of whic h 
they were predicated. In the Topics, Aristotle based his 
division of the predicables on the relations between sub-
ject and predicate . (I . c.8 . ) In this case, if the predicate 
is co-e xtensive with the subject, it gives the essence or 
property of the subject, as genus and species do. However, 
if the predicable is not co-extensive with the subject, it 
may be an accident. 
Of course the accident could also refer to the ways 
in which man thinks of things, that is, as qualities 
predicated of substances. This case of accident would 
.merely say that the accidentals are the categories which 
tell how substances actually e xist. 
Whether accident refers to the predicables or to th e 
categories, Augustine must exclude them from al l considera -
tions of the nature of God. (V.4 . 5.) The Greeks had called 
some accidents separable, and some inseparable. (V.4.5. ) 14 
These dist i nction s have no bearing whatever upon God's 
nature. Augustine argues that the feather of the raven is 
eternally bl ack, as the Greeks would say , but oniy so lon g 
as the raven i s . (V.4 . 5.) Although i t remains black while 
the r aven rema ins a l ive, upon the death of the raven t he 
I 
l 4 11 • • • q u cl e g r a e c e a p p e 1 l cl n tu r o..ll... uJ p u,-Ta.... II 
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black feather ceases to be as the raven itself ceases to 
be. In the process of decay, even the 11 inseparable acci-
. dent" vanishes. However, even though Augustine denies 
any accident to be true of God, whether it might be predi-
cable accident or categorical, separable or inseparable, it 
is the accidental and not the predication that Augustine 
must eliminate. 
If the predicate is co-extensive with the subject, it 
gives the essence or property of the subject. This kind of 
predication Augustine finds perfectly acceptable of God, 
because God is His attributes. These attributes are co-
extensive with God. Augustine grants that some things can be 
properly said of God because they are "essentially" true. 
Whatever is predicated of God according to substance is 
predicated equally and univocally of all three of the 
Persons. The Trinity as a whole, for example, and each of 
the divine Persons, is equally omnipotent and omniscient. 15 
However, Augustine is also obligated to say that God 
is not the Father in the same sense that He is wise. If God 
is the Father in that sense, the following dilem ma neces-
sarily arises: God is wise as He is Father; therefore, 11 Fat-
herhood " is 11 essential" to the first Person--it is entailed 
in His essence . .. The logical result is that three essences 
are entailed, which Augustine denies. God is not Father 
15Hodgs on , Tr i nity, p . 149. 
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according to a different consideration. Neither is God 
Father according to accident, becau s e there can be no 
mutability in God. An accident is always a feature of a 
created thing, even if it is a permanent fe at ure of a 
created thing, in which case it wi ll eventually cease to be 
when the thing ceases to be . 
Therefor e , Augustine cannot speak of the difference 
i n the three in terms of accident, nor can he refer to a 
d i fference in substance. One of the possibilities would 
entai l mutabilit y , and the other woul d make polytheism 
inevitable . Augustine has a better alternative. 
(3) Relation 
It is true that the more accurately the Godhead of 
both the Son and the Spir i t was distinguished by the church, 
"t he more important it became to determine exact l y the rela-
t i on i n which the different persons stood to each other, and 
to the di vine essence itself . 11 16 When he has developed a 
satisfactory explanation of the essence, chosen "person" 
as the term to signify "what three?", and exc luded any 
thought of accident , Augustine uses the term "relation" to 
make the distinct difference between the Persons . Yet, 
predicamental relations were defined as real accidents . 17 
16K. R. Hagenbach, A History of Christ i an Doctrines, 
2 vols. (Edi:-iburgh: T. & T. Clar~, 1883), l:374. 
17B. Mattingly, "Relation," ~:ew Cat holic Encyclopedia 
(New York : McGraw-Hill Book Company, 19G7), 12:217 . 
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But because there can be no change in God, the term 
"relation" cannot be allowed to apply to God in the accep­
ted, predicamental sense. What Augustine must do with the 
term is the kind of thing he did with essence and with 
person. As with the other two terms, "relation" is "lifted 
out of the set of categories applicable to finite being 
alone, for the relations among the persons of the Trinity, 
since they are not changeable, are not 'accidents' .1118 As
Augustine says: 
. . . in God nothing is said to be according 
to accident, because in Him nothing is 
changeable; and yet everything that is said, 
is not said according to substance. For it 
is said in relation to something, as the 
Father in relation to the Son and the Son in 
relation to the Father, which is not acci­
dent; because both the one is always Fathe1�and the other is always the Son. (V.5.6.) 
A Kedefinition 
Augustine redefines essence, person, and relation by 
removing them from the immanence-bound categories, and 
applying them to the transcendent Godhead. He is constantly 
aware of the imcomprehensibility of God, and therefore of 
the inability of "natural man" to understand fully the 
transcendent. (VII.6.12.) Bulk and space affect man's 
understanding. Because God is not bound by material 
lBTeSelle, p. 296.
19 11 • dicitur enim ad aliquid� sicut Pater ad
Filium, et Fi1ius ad Patrern. quad non est accidens. 11 
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qualifications, Augustine does not feel constra in ed to use 
purely materia li stic language when he considers the nature 
of God. 
What then is predicated relatively of the three 
Persons severally? Paternitas and filiatio, fatherhood and 
sonship, are obviously two. A third is that the Spirit is 
referred to as the "gift." The use of "gift" apparently 
caused some to err in understanding, and Augustine attempts 
to remove the confusion from the concept. If the Spirit is 
described as gift, it could look as though the personhood 
of th e Spirit were contingent upon that which happened in 
time, because must not a gift have a recipient? Here a 
distinction · in "relation" does have to be made. He says 
that: 
Whereas, in the same Trinity, some things 
severally are specially predicated, these are 
in no way said in reference to themselves in 
themselves, but either in mutual reference, or 
in respect to the creature; and therefore, it 
is manif est that such things are spoken rela-
tively, not in the way of substance. (V.11.12.) 
Therefore~ there are two ways in which relation might be 
applied: within the Trinity (ontologically), and to the 
creation. 
(1) Onto lo gica l 
Within the eternal Godhead, there is relationship, as 
the term refers to the difference in the Persons. ''The Son 
never ceases to be the Son, because the Son was always 
born, and never began to be the Son." (V.5.6.) It is only 
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in relation to the Father that the Son is so designated in 
the Trinitarian distinctions; and it is only as the Father 
is related to the Son as a father that He is so cal l ed. The 
Father is not so called in relation to Himself, nor is the 
Son called the Son in relation to Himse lf. If this were the 
case in either s ituation, it would be the case in both 
situations and also as a concept would apply to the Spiri t. 
If it were the case for the three, each woulct be so called 
according to substance, because there would be a fundamental 
difference in the three according to the nature of each. If 
the difference were according to nature, that is, substance, 
there would be three substances, and therefore three Gods 
would be the consequence. Of course this would be an 
impossible option . Therefore, it is on l y as the terms are 
used 11 reciprocally and in relation each to the other" that 
they apply. {V.5.6.) Likewise considered must be the terms 
11 begctten 11 and 11unbegotten. 11 
Au g u s t i n e d e a l s e x t e n s i v e 1 y \I/ i t h t h i s o: r e 1 a t i o n II t h e -
ory. (V.6.7., /.8., etc.) The argument itself appears 
sound, but there is a weakness in expression because in 
"relative things that are reciprocal, names are sometimes 
wanting. 11 (V.12.13.) Although one can speak of the Holy 
Spirit of the Father, the reciprocal i s not properly the 
case; that is, the Father is not the Father of the Holy 
Spirit. Or, for example, t he Spirit is the Spirit of both 
the Fath er and the Son, but the Son is not the Son of the 
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Holy Spirit; He is the Son of the Father, exclusively. Thi s 
is just the inadequacy of expression which Augustine has to 
admit. "For it is the case in many re lativ es, that no 
designation is to be found by which those things which bear 
relation to each other may (in name) mutua lly correspond to 
each other." (V.12.13.) That the Spirit is "gift" must have 
caused some to ask whether the Spirit was "gift" before as 
well as after He was g iv en. The lan guage must be examined 
closely. Augustine concludes this way: "For a g ift may 
exist even before i t is given ; but it cannot be ca lled a 
thing t hat has bc:en given unless it has been given." (V. 
15.16.) The point of this explanation is that within the 
ontological Tri n ity, relations persist; or, to use Rabbi 
Duncan's co·inage, the relation s "intersist. 1120 Although 
t h e r e 1 a t i o n s ni a y n o t a 1 w a y s h a v e e x p 1~ e s s i o n s t o e x p 1 a i n 
adequately the distinctions between the Persons, the rela-
tion s st ill exist, and continue to ex ist. 
(2) Econ omic 
This brin gs us to the second degree of relation, as 
Augustine uses it in r egard to creation. Nothing can be 
said of God in t i me as accidental, but only as relati ve . 
As concerning the designation of the Spir i t a3 11gift, 11 it 
20John (Ra bbi ) Duncan, Colloquia Peri~~k!ica. ed. 
Willia m Knight, 6th ed. (Edin bur gh and London: Oliphan t, 
Anderson, and Ferrier, 1907) , p . 1 28 . 
78 
is a gift eternally but a thing that has been g iv en in time; 
likewis e , for the Son to be Lord i s de scriptive of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h c r ea t i o n , i; 
. fo r the creature is not 
from all eternity of which He i s the Lord." (V.1 6. 17 . ) At 
any point in which the cha nge takes place in the relationship 
of man to God, or of any part of c re a tion to God, the 
chan ge i s in the creation, and not in God. A prime examp l e 
is man's conversion, and new so nsh i p in Chr ist. When a man 
comes to be a se rvant of God, Christ begins to be ca ll ed 
savior in this r e l at iv e sense. God is savio r in relation 
to the creation. This kind of illust rati on is used by 
Augus t ine to exp l a in that even in r espect to crea tion, God 
does not change. It is man himse lf who i s c han ged, a nd God 
' beco mes Father to man when the heart of man is made new. 
Anythin g that is said concerning the association of the 
Persons of the Godhead , _Qe..!:_ ~~-' which is not said of the 
Godhead acc ording to substance , is sa i d of that Person in 
relati on to another of the three; anyth in g t hat i s said of 
God, or e ither of the three Persons, co nce r ning His 
association with changeab l e creation, is sa id of Him in 
r ela tio n to the creat i on . In neith er case does God or 
either of the Persons change ; the distinction is made by a 
rel ations hip, with t he creat i on chang in g in t he one case , 
and an eternally existing and unchang eab l e relationship in 
the other . 
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Implications 
There are numerous implications of these theories of 
relation, accident, and person in Augustine's discussion. 
Some of the important ones are: 
(1) God Cannot Increase
There can be no addition to God. Actually this concept 
was expressed in some detail in the last chapter. But let us 
consider this problem: How can Augustine envision the 
incarnation, in which the Son took to Himself a true body 
and reasonable soul? Apparently this would be an addition 
to the Godhead, because it is the assumption of something 
not intrinsic to the second Person of the Trinity. If the 
incarnation were an addition, then God is mutable; but 
mutability must be denied by Augustine. What then is the 
solution? 
In Book VI, Augustine explains the concept that 11 Dei 
natura nvlla fit accessio. 11 A distinction must be made ---- ---
between the normal mode of thinking and the mode of thinking 
required to conceive of the spiritual, transcendent realm of 
the Godhead. In the material world, bodies increase by 
union of themselves, and the same bodies can decrease by 
separation. But, when the material is joined to the 
spiritual, one cannot imagine that the spiritual increases. 
"For in those things which are not great by bulk, to be 
greater is to be better . . . but yet th� Lord does not 
therefore become greater . . .  perfectness cannot increase." 
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(VI.8.) When the Son became man, nothing was added to God 
because to unite an i mper fe ct with perfect in no way 
perfects nor in creases the pe r fect. God can not become more 
perfect; He i s perfect already. It is not, th ere for e , an 
addition to His nature to take to Himse lf the form of a 
servant, as Paul says in Philippians 2. Therefore, God 
plus the human nature of the incarnate Christ is not greater 
than God minu s the human nature prior to the i ncarnat ion. 
The incarnation added not hin g to the second Person of the 
Trinity. Eve~ the in ca rn a tion, then, i s not a true counter-
example to Augustine's notion of the immutability of God. 
(2 _) Relati ve and Ess e nti a l Att ribu tes 
Some attributes of God are relati ve attr ibute s , and 
some refer to His na tur e. (VII . 2.3.) This point expresses 
the difference between tho se attributes which app ly to the 
relation of the Persons to each other, and as regarding 
the essence of the Godhead . Two examples a re u sed by Augus-
tine to explain t his difference: (a) Some of the attributes 
are similar to Wi sdom. Both the Fat he r and th e Son are 
together one wisdom, as they ar e one essence. No distinction 
can be made be tween this att ribute and t he one essence. 
Whether one thinks of the Father or the Son or the Spirit 
or the Godhead, it i s the same f or each or all to be, as to 
be Wisdom. (b} Howeve r, s uch i s rot the case co nce r ning 
the att ri but es which apply to t he d i ffe r ent r e l a tion s of 
the Trinity. Onl y the Son is t he Word, a nd not th e Fa t her 
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nor the Spirit, "for He is understood to be that Word 
relatively, but vvisdom es s entially. 11 (VI.2.3.) Thus, 
some things predicated of God must be considered predicated 
of the different Persons. Some things attributed obtain 
from relational differences. 
(3) 3 'I l 
In the Trinitarian distinctions, Augustine does not 
imply, as some might think , that l = 3, and 3 = 1. For 
such to be the case, of course, would be a logical contra-
diction, and certainly not what Augustine intends. If such 
were the case, Augustine 1 s argument would certainly suffer 
Harnack 1 s intended censure of being merely word bending. 
However, this is not the case. What Augustine does mean 
is that what is three in one respect, is one in a different 
respect. He does not attempt to say that three beings are 
one being, nor that three persons are one person. The bett e r 
way of understanding the trinality and unity would be as 
three .:!.I!_ one, and one~ three. As there is but one essen ce, 
the Godhe ad, there are three Persons who have relative and 
personal characteristics. 
If this is the correct interpretation of Augustine 1 s 
logical analysis, then his statement of the Trinity is not 
self-contradictory. He asserts only that the same God who 
is one with re s pect to Hi s e s senc e , is three with respe c t 
to the in~ e rnal di s tinctions of that es se nce, or with 
respect to modes of His Being. 
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Is this credible? The possibility of it cannot be 
denied without assuming either that the spiritual world 
does not exist, or that it cannot be known, or that the 
human mind is in all respects the measure of the divine. 
Conybeare has said of the distinctions in the Godhead: 
11 
••• though we cannot precisely determine what those 
differences are, we have no more reason to conclude them 
impossible, than a blind man hath to conclude the 
impossibility of colors because he cannot see them. 1121 
(4) Quasi-Subordination 
There is no subordination within the Godhead, except 
perhaps concerning the "relations"; and the concept of sub-
ordination can be used only when it is used very carefully. 
There is an absolute equality among the divine 
Persons in respect to the essence which they are, and all are 
alike infinite and perfect in that essence. Augustine says 
that "if the Son were not equal to the Father, He would not 
be the I son' of God. 00 22 The relations of the Persons of 
the Trinity, therefore, are not designations of degree of 
perfection or essence. Thus, when one speaks of the first 
or second or third Person of the Trinity, he uses these 
terms to apply to the relationships or simple numerical 
order of the Persons. These terms do not imply any kind 
21 S he d d , Do q ma t i c , 1 : 2 6 8 - 2 6 9 , quot i n g Cc n y be a re , 0 n_ 
M·;racles. 
22sermon 140, 5, quoted by Shedd, pogmatic, 1 :301. 
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of priority either of nature, substance, existence, or 
excellence. 
However, as a relation the Sonship is subordinate to 
the Fatherhood because the begettor is the cause of the 
begotten; but again this distinguishes no degree of value 
or quality within the Godhead. "The Father stood above the 
Son and the Spirit in this that he alone is of no other, but 
is absolutely original and indep enden t; while the Son is 
begotten of him, and the Spirit proceeds fro m him, and 
proceeds from him in a higher sense than from the Son. 1123 
Again, the functions ascribed to the Persons of the 
Trinity in the redempt~ve process express a kind of subordi-
nation. The Father comes first, and then the Son, and 
finally the Spirit in the operation of God as redeemer. The 
Father sends the Son who purchases redemption, and the 
redemption is applied to man by the work of the Spirit. 
However, this in no way violates the basic, 11essential 11 
equality of the Persons of the Trinity. To say that they 
function in a certain order in creation and redemption makes 
no qualitative judgment concerning the essence of the Persons. 
If Augustine uses the co ncept carefully, he can say 
that a kind of subordinationism does exist between the 
Trinitarian Persons, and as the Persons relate to creation, 
especially to man. If he uses the term in this sense, as a 
23Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church 
{Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964), 
2:685. 
84 
relative subordination, these distinctions in no way 
violate the Augustinian principle of three in one and 
one in three. 
A Short · Evaluation 
As must be _apparent by this time, Augustine did 
something quite radical with the Trinitarian discussion by 
moving several aspects of this discussion to an altogether 
new language level. That the three Persons of the i mmutable 
Trinity are di ffe rent concerning 11 relations 11 moves the 
concept of r e lation beyond the boundaries of bulk a nd space. 
The differences within the Godhea d obtain only because of 
distinctions of relation, either ontologically or economi-
cally. A similar thing was done with essence and Person, 
as he did with relation . In so moving the discussion to this 
new level of languag~ Augustine produced an important result: 
he was enabled to talk meaningfully about God both as unity 
and trinality without lapsing into se lf-contradiction. 
By ra ising th e level of language to fit the Biblical 
description> Augustine was able to extricate his argument 
from subordination in the Arian sense of the term. According 
to the predecessors of Augustine, the Father was the cause 
of both tl) the existence and (2) the Godhood of the other 
two Persons . . ~ugustine, however, improv ed upon this 
understanding; the Father did not make them God, but the Son 
s t a n cl s i n r e l a t i o n t c, H i m a s " b e g o t t e n , 11 a s t h e S p i r i t i s 
11 s r i r-2. t e d . '' T h u s , f r om .t\ u g u s t i n e • s po i n t of v i e w , a s one 
... 
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discusses the denial of singleness of the Trinity, the 
marked emphasis on the unity of the essence can also be 
maintained throughout. There is no difference in the 
essence of the Father, Son, and Spirit; it is the same 
essence. The Godhead is in the form of three; the three are 
the Godhead. The relationships, as the Son begotten or the 
Spirit spirated, make no inequality within the Godhead. 
Only as the Son is Son in �elation to the Father is the Son 
begotten. Thus, the terms designate a relation; but, as 
Augustine argued, it is an eternal relationship. 
As several critics have indicated, Basil had already 
described the differences among the three Persons in terms 
of causal relation, and even used this argument against 
the Sabellians. But it was Augustine's strong emphasis on 
the distinctive divine relations which became the terminus 
� for the subsequent Trinitarian discussions. Augus­
tine 1 s discussion of the Trinitarian Persons makes it all 
but impossible to think of God without thinking of Him as 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Subsequent history validates 
this fact. Whereas the earlier fathers had sought to find 
a unity to encompass the three, and actually failed, 
Augustine succeeded in attempting to express the unity 
first; then the Trinality became his object of concern. 
When he had sufficiently established the unchangeable, 
'' es sent i a l II u n i t y of t he God he a d , o f co u rs e the re a 1 pro b I em 
was the Trinality. But it is to Augustine's great credit, 
( 
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and to the great benefit of the church through the ages, 
that he gave an acceptable exp l a nation of the relations of 
th e thre e Persons. In so doing, Augustine overcame both 
the monarchial and the polythei stic tendencies by admitting 
the inadequacy of human l angu age, and working from that 
point. 
CONCLUSION 
In the introduction two criticismi were mentioned of 
Augustine's De Trinitate. Harnack cal led the linguistic 
distinctio ns "sacred paradoxes." Another critic, L. L. 
Paine, described Augustine's logical analysis as jumping-
jack logic. We acknowledged that these criticismswould 
have to form the crucib l e for the ana ly sis of Augustine's 
success or failure in De Trinitate. That Augustine and his 
work on the Trinity have been greatly acclaimed by t he 
church until t his day i s not a sure sign that his efforts 
in De Tri nitate are significantly accurate. Church approval 
does not entail logical accu r acy. The only true basis upon 
which Augustine 's work can be evaluated is to determine 
whether he consistently avoided the pitfalls of modali sm 
and polytheism, whi l e offering a sufficient answer to 
explain how one God can be Father, Son, and Hol y Spirit. 
Linqui stic Analysis 
If there is ingenuity in Augustine's De Trinitate, it 
is the way he used linguistic analysis to his advantage. 
Actually Augustine stripped the terms which must be used to 
discu ss God and the Father . Son, and Spirit, of the things 
which can not be said of God. 
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(1) Substance 
Augustine eliminated from the concept called 11 substance 11 
-the precticamentals implied by the material world. He 
explained the concepts in terms of transcendent substance, 
or as Shedd called it, spiritual substance. 
By his analysis of the term, Augustine removed at 
least three problems from the discussion. First, he 
eliminated the terminological confusion. Although Augustine 
was willing to use the word substantia, he said that 
essentia would better suit the purpose in hand. By changing 
the established Latin terminology, apparently he was 
attempting to draw a distinction between the accepted idea 
of substance, and the only notion that can describe the Being 
of God. Thus, previous confusions were excised by 
Augustine's redefinition of the concept as essentia. 
A second problem resolved by the lifting of substance 
to the realm of the transcendent was that Aristotelian 
connotations were eradicated from the concept of pure 
essence. The connotations which could not be allowed in 
the discussion of the nature of God were those describing 
accident, or change. Becau se God is immutable, nothing can 
be said of His Being which implies mutability. By their 
very nature, the Aristotelian terms of the Cate~ories were 
devised to se parate linguistically the predicamentals which 
describ e thin gs as they are. The~efore, because of the 
very intent of the Aristotelian categories, they could not 
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be used in an accurate description of the nature of God. 
By liftin g essence, or substance, from the context of 
changeable reality, Augustine conceived of essence, or pure 
reality, beyond the predicamental categories. However, he 
did no t attempt to say that essence i s a term with no 
predicamentals. Only predicamentals connoting mutability 
were removed. Those predicamentals true of the Being of God, 
are His Being. They are not qualities which can increase or 
decrease; they are true of His nature. 
A third prob le m eliminated by the transcending of 
essence was the idea of subordination within the ontological 
Godhead. Various churchmen had mistakenly thought that there 
was an essential difference between the Son and Sp irit, and 
the Father. Although the church counc ils had repudiated such 
an idea, the correct manner in which to under stand the pre-
cise relationshi~ of the three had to be explained. Augus-
tine's strength was also the occasion for the possibility 
of weakness in the matter, however. He emphas ized the one 
pure, spiritual substance, and thereby destroyed any pos-
sibility of an essential difference i n the Father, Son, and 
Spirit. But in so emphasizing the unity, Augustine sugges-
ted the occasion for future criticism. The more concretely 
the unity is affirmed, the more difficult it must be to give 
a cr edib l e explanation of the trinality. for this very 
rea s on Harnack ind i r ectly ac cu s ed Augustine of slipping 
into modal ism. 
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t2) Person 
Augustine transcendentalized the notion of person 
also, to eliminate from it concepts not appropriate of the 
three individuals of the Godhead. 
Augustine's sense of the term "person" is similar to, 
I 
but differs in several aspects from the Greek rrpou'wrrov'and 
the Latin persona. Augustine's "person" did not suffer 
under the ideas of mutability as did the vernacular of 
rrpc�wrrc--/ and persona. 
By the use of 11 person 11 in his purified sense, Augustine 
was enabled to say three somethings, but three in a differ­
ent sense than the one essence. Therefore, there are 
three Persons in one essence, but the one and the three are 
not said in an equivalent sense. The numerical solution is 
three in one and one in three. True and permanent distinc­
tions were then made credible by this usage of person. 
(3) Relation
The other concept to be lifted from the categories of 
predicamentals was 11relation. 11 The relation of the Cate­
.9..2. r i1 e s e n t a i 1 e d t h e n o t i o n o f c ha n g e ; bu t s i n c e t h i s i s a 
false idea in speaking of God, it had to be barred from 
the discussion of the nature of the Father, Son and Spirit 
distinctions. 
Two kinds of relations were established in considering 
the Godhead. Some of the relational distinctions apply to 
the ontological Trinity. The Son is Son eternally, but 
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only in relation to the Fathe r. The distinctions imply no 
essential difference) but only a relational difference. 
Eternal relations of the three distinctions express the 
justification for saying there is a trinality of persons 
and a unity of essence. 
Relations also exist in the economic Trinity, the 
Trinity as it expresses itself ad extra in creation and 
redempti on. The Son is savior of God's elect only in 
relation to the creation. No qualitative or quantitative 
difference enhances or decreases the nature of the Son in 
His relation to creation; it is man who changes to become 
the servant of God. Thus, no change takes place in the 
Persons of the Godhead. 
As a result, Augustine 1 s " relation 11 is used analogously 
to the r e lation of the Categories. But, Augustine rede-
fined it as he redefined substance and person. 
The Real Point of Criticism 
The li nguistic analyses, in themselves, are not the 
real points of criticism of Augustine's De Trinitate. The 
fact that Augustine removed the notion of mutability from 
words normally conceived of as descriptive of the mutable 
world is indicative of the rea l points of difference in 
Augustine and some of his critics, and is indicative of the 
real point of his argument which must be assessed to deter-
m·ine the sti·ength or weakness of his notion of the Trinity. 
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Durrant says that it is imposs ib le to accept August ine' s 
ideas, because God, in Augustine's sense of the word "God, 11 
cannot perform those rules and exhibit the feature s of 
material language. 1 Durrant helps here by indicating that 
there is a presuppositional difference in his and Augustine's 
understanding of what "God" can and cannot be. The basi c 
question then is what presuppositions one is willing to 
acknowledge and accept for the sake of discussion. 
The Presuppositional Differences 
{1) If one grants Durrant 's view, either of two 
alternatives becomes obvious. Either the non-material, 
purely spir itual world does not exist at all, or our 
language is completely unsuitable to discuss it . In the 
first instance, the term "God" is completely void of 
meaning; it must be purely mytho logi ca 1. In the second 
instance, one may grant t he possibility of "God," but 
nothing whatsoever can be said of Him. God in this case 
would be completely beyond the descriptive abilities of mar.. 
No humanly conce ived representation of God could be true in 
any way. Unly silence of the sp iritual realm could be the 
r esu lt. 
(2) If one grants Augustine's view, there is an 
authoritative description of the nature of all reality, the 
Bible. Therefore, on the basis of the Bible's authority, 
lnurr a nt, p. 71. 
I 
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God does exist as a unitary Godhead, but also as Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit. Man must then attempt to describe 
reality, the spiritual as well as the material or 
scientific, as well as possible. Linguistic difficulties 
must be admitted, as Augustine did admit. The insufficiency 
of scientific analysis and description must be granted also. 
With the limitations acknowledged, however, man must tailor 
his language to fit reality. 
(3) However, this raises the question of the purpose 
of language. That Augustine was inclined to mold his langu-
age to reality brings into relief another way of looking at 
the criticism of Augustine's work in De Trinitate . Certainly 
reality is not known independently of language; yet 
language may distort the view of reality by inaccurately 
portraying it. Augustine refined his language to portray 
reality. Apparently, Durrant is not willing to have 
lan guage fit the nature of reality. Apparently, the Aris-
totelian categories must determine the nature of reality. 
How naive this approach sounds. Words are certainly func-
tional, and not determinative. Reality must be described, 
not determined, by language. If the view of language 
which determined Augustine's freedom to fashion words to 
describe reality is accepted, his discussion does not lapse 
into sacr ed paradoxes, and his analysis is not jumping-jack 
logic. By very intrica te and ingenious distinctions in 
concept s, Augustin~ att empted to do what l ang uage can only 
do in an analogous fashion. 
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An Evaluation 
Augustine made no pretense of giving a scientifically 
demonstrable understanding of the Trinity; he did not 
attempt to prove the Trinity at all. Rather, he work�d 
from his basic frame of reference, acknowledging that faith 
precedes knowledge. Therefore, he attempted to give a more 
credible explanation of that which faith affirms. The view 
of reality projected by the Bible was, for Augustine, the 
true projection, and the scientifically demonstrable was not 
all of reality. The spiritual world beyond bulk and space 
likewise exists. From this assumption, he attempted to 
ex�lain as understandably as possible that which was 
believed. 
Therefore, if one expects De Trinitate to be a testable 
proof, it fails miserably. However, if one grants the 
possiblity of a triune God, Augustine's work is most helpful 
in understanding the nature of that God. 
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